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Abstract—Cognitive radios enable dynamic spectrum access5
where secondary users (SUs) are allowed to operate on the licensed6
spectrum bands on an opportunistic noninterference basis. Coop-7
eration among the SUs for spectrum sensing is essential for environ-8
ments with deep shadows. In this paper, we study the adverse effect9
of insistent spectrum sensing data falsification (ISSDF) attack on10
iterative distributed cooperative spectrum sensing. We show that11
the existing trust management schemes are not adequate in miti-12
gating ISSDF attacks in dynamic settings where the primary user13
(PU) of the band frequently transitions between active and inactive14
states. We propose a novel context-aware distributed trust frame-15
work for cooperative spectrum sensing in mobile cognitive radio ad16
hoc networks (CRAHN) that effectively alleviates different types17
of ISSDF attacks (Always-Yes, Always-No, and fabricating) in dy-18
namic scenarios. In the proposed framework, the SU nodes evaluate19
the trustworthiness of one another based on the two possible con-20
texts in which they make observations from each other: PU absent21
context and PU present context. We evaluate the proposed context-22
aware scheme and compare it against the existing context-oblivious23
trust schemes using theoretical analysis and extensive simulations24
of realistic scenarios of mobile CRAHNs operating in TV white25
space. We show that in the presence of a large set of attackers26
(as high as 60% of the network), the proposed context-aware trust27
scheme successfully mitigates the attacks and satisfy the false alarm28
and missed-detection rates of 10−2 and lower. Moreover, we show29
that the proposed scheme is scalable in terms of attack severity,30
SU network density, and the distance of the SU network to the PU31
transmitter.32
Index Terms—Cognitive radio, context awareness, cooperative33
systems, mobile ad hoc networks, network security, radio spectrum34
management, wireless networks.35
Manuscript received December 24, 2016; revised March 24, 2017; accepted
May 28, 2017. Date of publication; date of current version. This work was
supported in part by the U.S. National Science Foundation under Grant ECCS-
1408370, Grant CNS-1265332, and Grant ECCS-1232274, and in part by
the U.S.–Ireland R&D Partnership USI033 “WiFiLoc8” grant involving Rice
University (USA), University College Dublin (Ireland), and Queen’s Univer-
sity Belfast (Northern Ireland). The review of this paper was coordinated
by Dr. X. Huang. (Corresponding author: Aida Vosoughi.)
A. Vosoughi and J. R. Cavallaro are with the Department of Electrical and
Computer Engineering, Rice University, Houston, TX 77005 USA (e-mail:
vosoughi@rice.edu; cavallar@rice.edu).
A. Marshall is with the Department of Electrical Engineering and Electronics,
University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 3GJ, U.K. (e-mail: alan.marshall@
liverpool.ac.uk).
Color versions of one or more of the figures in this paper are available online
at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TVT.2017.2716361
I. INTRODUCTION 36
THE dynamic spectrum access (DSA) paradigm, en- 37abled by cognitive radios, facilitates flexible and efficient 38
spectrum usage by allowing secondary users (SUs) to use li- 39
censed spectrum bands of primary users (PUs) on an opportunis- 40
tic non-interference basis [1]. The SUs must perform spectrum 41
sensing in order to avoid interference with the PUs. Coopera- 42
tive spectrum sensing (CSS) that exploits the spatial diversity 43
in the SU network effectively relaxes the sensitivity require- 44
ments on individual SUs and improves the overall sensing per- 45
formance [2]. Distributed cooperative spectrum sensing (DCSS) 46
is preferred to a centralized scheme (with a fusion center) as it 47
is scalable, fault-tolerant and more efficient [3]. DCSS also en- 48
ables cooperative sensing in cognitive radio ad hoc networks 49
(CRAHN) where there is no base station or infrastructure. The 50
existing DCSS schemes which are inspired by distributed aver- 51
age consensus algorithms are based on iterative diffusion and ag- 52
gregation of data through linear iteration-based or gossip-based 53
schemes and involve communication with direct neighbors in 54
the network graph [4]–[6]. 55
Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification (SSDF) [7] is a known 56
attack for cooperative spectrum sensing schemes, where mali- 57
cious SUs broadcast falsified sensing data to their neighbors in 58
order to mislead them and compromise the spectrum sharing in 59
the cognitive radio network. SSDF attack can cause the SUs to 60
make incorrect decisions about the PU activity which will result 61
in increased interference from the SUs to the PU and will also 62
lead to underutilization of the free spectrum. Insistent SSDF 63
(ISSDF) attack [8], [9], in particular, is aimed at iterative DCSS 64
schemes where the attacker not only falsifies its sensing data 65
but it also broadcasts the falsified value in every iteration of the 66
cooperation and refrains from updating its value according to 67
the iterative protocol. Thus, ISSDF attacks can be very harmful. 68
Fig. 1 depicts the behavior of three main types of attackers that 69
have been considered for CSS namely fabricating, Always-Yes, 70
and Always-No [10], [11]. Always-Yes and Always-No attack- 71
ers constantly broadcast high and low power values as their 72
sensing reports, respectively, regardless of the PU activity state. 73
In contrast, a fabricating attacker generates a falsified low or 74
high value indicating the opposite of the true PU activity state. 75
Distributed trust schemes have been recently introduced for 76
DCSS that require each SU node to maintain a single sliding 77
observation vector per each SU [12], [13]. Whenever an SU 78
node i receives a value from another node j, node i compares 79
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Fig. 1. PU dynamic settings and different types of attackers.
the reported value from j with its own decision about the PU80
state. Based on this evaluation, node i tags the observation from81
node j as either an agreement or a conflict and records that82
in the corresponding observation vector. The trust score that83
node i assigns to j is then calculated based on the ratio of84
agreements over the total number of observations (the length85
of the observation vector) [12], [13]. We call the above trust86
derivation approach “context-oblivious” as the SU nodes do87
not distinguish between the observations based on the current88
PU activity context. Instead, they make blind observations and89
record all of the observations in a single observation vector90
regardless of the context.91
We will show in this paper that the existing context-oblivious92
trust schemes are vulnerable to ISSDF attacks in dynamic set-93
tings, where the PU of the spectrum band transitions between94
active and inactive states over time. Thus, these techniques can-95
not protect the SUs and accordingly the SU nodes make incorrect96
detection decisions which are harmful to both the primary and97
secondary users of the spectrum.98
Fig. 2(a) shows an example of the vulnerability of the ex-99
isting agreement/conflict context-oblivious trust schemes. The100
Always-Yes attacker broadcasts high values (as its sensing re-101
port) all the time, even when the PU is active; therefore, in an102
active cycle (the duration when the PU is active), an honest node103
will most likely be in agreement with the Always-Yes attacker.104
Thus, the attacker seems to be non-malicious in the view of the105
honest node. As a result, the attacker is highly trusted at the106
end of an active cycle. Fig. 2(b) shows that in an inactive cycle,107
the Always-Yes attacker who has earned high trust in the pre-108
vious active cycle is able to deceive the honest node to believe109
that the PU is active. As a result, the honest SU refrains from110
using the free channel. This increased false alarm rate among111
the honest SUs leads to no utilization or underutilization of the112
free spectrum which is very harmful to the SU network. The113
context-oblivious trust schemes have a similar vulnerability in114
mitigating Always-No attackers in dynamic settings, as the trust115
of Always-No attackers is increased in the PU inactive cycles.116
In this paper, we show the vulnerability of the existing trust117
management schemes in dynamic settings are due to the fact that118
these schemes are context-oblivious. In order to solve the above-119
mentioned problem and to mitigate the attacks effectively, we120
present the following contributions:121
1) To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to intro-122
duce a context-aware trust scheme for DCSS in a mobile123
CRAHN that is resilient to ISSDF attacks in dynamic124
Fig. 2. An Always-Yes attack scenario in PU dynamic settings and vulner-
ability of the existing (context-oblivious) schemes: (a) The trust score of the
Always-Yes attacker is increased when PU is active. (b) In the PU inactive cycle,
the highly trusted attacker deceives the honest SU to believe PU is active; thus,
the honest SU remains inactive and does not use the free channel.
settings where the PU frequently transitions between ac- 125
tive and inactive states. In our proposed scheme, the trust 126
observations are distinguished based on the speculated 127
context: PU-Present or PU-Absent context. Thus, the trust 128
evaluation of a peer SU is significantly more effective than 129
the current context-oblivious schemes because it is done 130
in a more informed manner. 131
2) We present a theoretical analysis to evaluate the agreement 132
probability (thus, the level of trust) between the honest 133
nodes and the attackers in the presence of different types 134
of ISSDF attacks (Always-Yes, Always-No, fabricating) 135
and considering the honest mistakes of the honest nodes. 136
The analysis is presented for both the context-oblivious 137
and the proposed context-aware trust schemes. 138
3) With both theoretical analysis and extensive Monte Carlo 139
simulations, we show that the introduced context-aware 140
trust scheme significantly increases the resilience of itera- 141
tive DCSS schemes to ISSDF attacks in dynamic settings. 142
Adopting the proposed trust scheme enables a mobile SU 143
network with 20% malicious nodes in a realistic and dy- 144
namic environment to satisfy the false alarm and missed- 145
detection rates as low as 10−3. For a similar scenario, the 146
existing trust schemes cannot even achieve an error rate 147
of 10−1 regardless of the detection threshold. 148
4) We show that our proposed trust framework is able to 149
effectively mitigate Always-Yes, Always-No and fabri- 150
cating attacks in different scenarios with high level of 151
attack severity, even when the majority of the nodes in 152
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the network are malicious. In addition, we show that our153
proposed scheme is scalable in terms of network density154
and the distance from the PU transmitter.155
II. RELATED WORK156
The conventional SSDF attacks and mitigation approaches157
against them have been well-studied in the literature for the158
centralized CSS schemes [7], [10], [11], [14]–[18]. A known159
mitigation technique against SSDF attacks is that each node as-160
signs history-based trust scores to its neighbors and it weights161
their sensing reports according to the scores [7]. Recently, aver-162
age consensus algorithms including gossip-based protocols and163
linear iteration-based schemes have been used for the DCSS ap-164
plications [3], [19]–[23]. However, ISSDF attack in the iterative165
DCSS schemes is hardly explored.166
ISSDF attackers are similar to stubborn agents [24], who167
have fixed opinions and do not update their beliefs based on168
other agents’ opinions. It is shown that the initial opinion of169
the normal (not stubborn) agents have essentially no impact170
on the long-run opinion distribution [24]. Sundaram et al. [25]171
also consider a similar attack model aimed at distributed func-172
tion calculation using linear iterations where the attackers do173
not follow the iterative update protocol and instead arbitrarily174
update their values in each iteration. It is shown that the net-175
work graph connectivity is a key factor in resilience to these176
malicious nodes [25]. However, the attack introduced in [25]177
is different from the ISSDF attack in that the attackers do not178
change (falsify) their initial values to affect the cooperation.179
A trust-aware gossip-based DCSS scheme has been proposed180
in [20]; however, it does not consider ISSDF attacks and does181
not benefit from the broadcast nature of wireless and it consid-182
ers sharing of binary decisions among the nodes. A proposed183
approach to mitigate the ISSDF attackers in iterative DCSS184
schemes is outlier detection [26], [27] which is based on detect-185
ing the nodes that broadcast values that are deviated from the186
rest of the neighbors in each iteration. However, this approach187
requires every node to compute a deviation threshold at each188
iteration which imposes a significant computational overhead189
on each SU. In contrast, in our proposed scheme, as will be ex-190
plained, the SUs update the trust scores only once the consensus191
iterations are completed and therefore the computational over-192
head is low. Liu et al. [13] propose a trust scheme using trust193
propagation and a set of pre-trusted nodes to mitigate the effect194
of Byzantine adversaries in linear iterative consensus in sensor195
networks. However, trust propagation is costly and generally196
there are no pre-trusted nodes in an ad hoc network.197
A distributed and low-overhead trust management scheme198
has been proposed recently that is integrated with a consensus-199
inspired DCSS scheme to mitigate ISSDF attacks [12]. However,200
this scheme is context-oblivious, and as explained in Section I201
it cannot mitigate different types of attacks in dynamic settings.202
To the best of our knowledge, the proposed scheme in this paper203
is the first context-aware trust scheme for DCSS applications204
that can effectively mitigate Always-Yes, Always-No and fab-205
ricating ISSDF attackers in dynamic settings without the need206
for centralized or pre-trusted nodes. In addition, our proposed207
Fig. 3. System overview: Mobile SUs (honest and malicious) are moving
in a square location area with diverse shadow fading. Blue represents lower
received signal strength from the PU transmitter due to deep shadow fades and
red represents higher signal strength.
scheme only requires the nodes to perform a single local trust 208
evaluation per sensing round for each direct neighbor, thus the 209
overhead is minimal. 210
III. SYSTEM MODEL 211
We consider a network of n SU nodes that form a mobile 212
CRAHN. The nodes are moving in a square location area within 213
the range of a single stationary PU transmitter which is located 214
outside the square area. Fig. 3 depicts the system overview. 215
Random way point mobility [28] is adopted to model the SU 216
nodes’ mobility. A network of PU receivers (either mobile or 217
stationary) may coexist with the SUs in the same location area. 218
Therefore, whenever the PU transmitter is active, the SU’s must 219
remain silent to avoid interference to the PU receivers. The 220
detection of a PU transmission is modeled as a binary hypothesis 221
testing problem as follows: H0 if PU is absent and H1 if PU is 222
present. Each SU is equipped with an energy detector to perform 223
spectrum sensing by measuring the received power from the PU 224
transmitter. The received signal by an SU can be modeled as 225
follows: 226
y(m) =
{
w(m) H0
s(m) + w(m) H1
(1)
where s(m) is the signal component with power PS and w(m) is 227
the zero-mean additive white Gaussian noise with noise power 228
PN . When the PU is inactive, the sensed power at an SU will 229
essentially be equal to the received noise power. On the other 230
hand, when the PU is active, the signal component power PS in 231
dB can be modeled as PT − PL(d)[dB], where PT is the PU 232
transmission power andPL(d) is the path loss from the PU to the 233
SU located in distance, d. If the power detector takes M samples, 234
the test statistic is given by: Γ = 1M
∑M
m=1 y(m)y(m)
∗
. Using 235
the central limit theorem, it can be shown that for large enough 236
M [29], [30], the test statistic for a detector follows a normal 237
distribution [31]: 238
Γ ∼ N (PS + PN , 2(PS + PN )
2
M
) (2)
We model path loss as PL(d) = PL(d) + ψdB [dB] where 239
PL(d) is the average path loss based on the Hata model (subur- 240
ban areas variant) [32], and ψdB is a Gaussian random variable 241
in dB with zero mean and a standard deviation of σψdB in dB 242
modeling log-normal shadow fading. Therefore the total dB loss 243
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is characterized by a Gaussian distribution with mean PL(d)244
and standard deviation σψdB . The correlation between shadow245
fading at two locations separated by distance δ is characterized246
by A(δ) = σ2ψdB e−δ/Xc , where Xc is the decorrelation distance247
and is usually on the order of the size of the obstacles in the en-248
vironment [32], [33]. Therefore, closely located receivers (with249
smaller δ) experience highly correlated shadowing. We model250
shadows in the environment using random two-dimensional cor-251
related shadow fading maps [34] similar to the example heatmap252
shown in Fig. 3.253
In a non-cooperative scenario, an SU node decides on the PU254
activity by comparing its own received power test statistic, Γ,255
with a detection threshold, γ. The spectrum sensing performance256
is characterized by the probability of false alarm (PF A ) and257
missed-detection (PM D ):258
PF A = Pr(Γ > γ|H0) and PM D = Pr(Γ < γ|H1) (3)
In a distributed cooperative spectrum sensing model, the SU259
nodes first sense and measure the received power and then share260
their power measurements with each other to estimate the aver-261
age received power. After a number of broadcast and update iter-262
ations, each SU compares its own estimate of the average power263
with a threshold to make its final binary decision about the PU264
presence. We assume a fixed communication range for all of the265
SU nodes in the network. When a node broadcasts a message,266
all of the nodes within its predefined radius (one-hop neighbors)267
will receive that message. Obviously, the neighborhoods are al-268
ways changing due to the mobility of the nodes; however, we269
assume that during one sensing period the SU network topology270
remains unchanged. Here we assume perfect communication271
between the SUs via a common control channel [35].272
In a cooperative spectrum sensing model, a subset of nodes273
may be malicious. In this paper, we consider the insistent spec-274
trum sensing data falsification (ISSDF) attack model [8]. ISSDF275
attackers broadcast falsified sensing data to their neighbors in276
order to cause false alarm or missed-detection errors and to277
deteriorate the performance of spectrum sensing at the honest278
(non-malicious) SU nodes. ISSDF attackers do not update their279
estimates according to the cooperation protocol, instead in order280
to make the highest impact on the network, they broadcast their281
falsified values in all of the iterations. We consider three types282
of ISSDF attackers (Always-Yes, Always-No and fabricating).283
In our model, we adopt the trust-aware DCSS scheme intro-284
duced in [12]. The iterative update rule is as follows:285
vi(c + 1) = θii(t)vi(c) +
∑
j∈Ri θij (t)vj (c)
1 + |Ri | , i = 1, ..., n
(4)
where vi(c) denotes the value at SU node i at iteration c, and286
Ri is the set of nodes from which node i received a value in this287
iteration. θij (t) denotes the trust score of node j at the current288
sensing round t in the viewpoint of node i and the self-trust289
is θii(t) = 1−
∑
j ∈R i θi j (t)
1+ |Ri | . The integration of trust scores as290
weights into the linear iteration-based consensus scheme, makes291
the combination biased so that the values from more trustworthy292
neighbors are more effective than the others. The estimation of293
the trust scores has been the subject of study of many of the294
previous research works that were mentioned in Section II and 295
different trust schemes have been proposed [7], [10], [12], [13], 296
[18]. In the next section, we introduce our novel distributed 297
context-aware trust framework for trust score derivation which 298
proves to be significantly superior to the previous methods in 299
realistic dynamic settings. 300
IV. PROPOSED CONTEXT-AWARE TRUST FRAMEWORK 301
In a realistic cognitive radio network, the primary user of 302
the spectrum band transitions between active and inactive states 303
over time. We show that the dynamics of the PU activity makes 304
the existing context-oblivious trust management schemes (e.g. 305
[12], [13]) vulnerable to ISSDF attacks. In the existing trust 306
schemes, each node records all of its observations from another 307
node in a single observation vector, regardless of the context in 308
which the observations are made. 309
In contrast, we introduce a context-aware trust management 310
scheme that separates the observations based on the speculated 311
context (PU-Absent or PU-Present). At each sensing round, each 312
SU speculates about the PU activity using all of the available 313
information (from its own sensing and its cooperating neigh- 314
bors’ reports) and conjectures the current context. Based on this 315
speculated context, the SU will record the observations from 316
its neighbors in the corresponding observation vectors. In fu- 317
ture sections, we show with analysis and experiments that in 318
realistic dynamic scenarios, our proposed context-aware trust 319
scheme is superior to the existing context-oblivious schemes 320
and can effectively mitigate different types of ISSDF attacks. 321
Next, we elaborate the proposed context-aware trust scheme. 322
Node i maintains two observation vectors per each peer 323
node j: 1) “Absent observation vector”, OAij , 2) “Present ob- 324
servation vector”, OPij . At the end of each sensing round, node i 325
speculates and sets the context based on its own final coopera- 326
tive decision: either PU-Absent or PU-Present. If at this sensing 327
round node i has received a value from node j, node i records the 328
observation from node j based on the context. The observation 329
is recorded in OAij if the current context set by i is PU-Absent and 330
in OPij if the context is PU-Present. The observation is binary: 0 331
is recorded if node i and j disagree and 1 is recorded if the two 332
nodes agree on the PU activity in this sensing round. The obser- 333
vation vectors are essentially sliding windows of limited size, 334
thus, if an observation vector is full at the time of recording a 335
new observation, the oldest entry will be discarded. Algorithm 1 336
describes our proposed context-aware observations for context- 337
aware trust management. gij (t) denotes the initial value that 338
node i received from neighbor j in the first consensus iteration 339
of sensing round t, thus, referring back to (4), gij (t) is equiva- 340
lent to vj (0). The final estimate of node i at sensing round t is 341
denoted by yi(t) which is equivalent to vi(c = final iteration) 342
in (4). γ denotes the detection threshold. 343
At sensing round (time) t, node i calculates two trust scores, 344
θAij (t) and θPij (t) based on the absent and present observation 345
vectors, respectively. Equation (5) shows that the scores are 346
calculated based on the fraction of the observations that are 347
agreements. H(.) denotes the Hamming weight of the binary 348
vector and |.| is the length. The required length of the observation 349
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Fig. 4. Proposed context-aware trust scheme: At each sensing round, node i
updates the trust score assigned to node j based on the minimum of the scores
corresponding to the PU-Absent and PU-Present contexts.
vectors are discussed in Section IV-A in detail. We adopt the zero350
trust initialization strategy [12] which means the trust scores351
are initialized to zero and remain zero until the corresponding352
observation vectors are filled up to the predefined vector length.353
In addition, the scores are updated only when the final decisions354
are made at each sensing round and not in between the consensus355
iterations.356
θAij (t) =
H(OAij )
|OijA |
, θPij (t) =
H(OPij )
|OPij |
(5)
In each sensing round, node i cannot make its final decision357
(and set the context) before the cooperation is complete in358
that round. Therefore, during the cooperation, it cannot know359
which of the two trust scores (θAij (t) or θPij (t)) to use for a peer360
nodes j. We propose a conservative approach where the lowest361
of the two scores is picked as the final trust score:362
θij (t) = min(θAij (t), θ
P
ij (t)) (6)
Fig. 4 depicts the context-aware trust update algorithm in a363
flow chart representation showing the procedure of node i364
updating the trust score assigned to node j at one sensing 365
round. Following the proposed strategy, the honest nodes take 366
no risk and as a result, malicious nodes are always detected 367
and excluded. The conservative score assignment strategy is 368
advantageous because a node that is malicious in one context 369
and not malicious in another context is always assigned a low 370
score corresponding to the context in which it is malicious. 371
As a result, a malicious node will have minimum effect on the 372
honest nodes when it performs its malicious behavior. 373
Consider the example of an Always-Yes attacker j and let us 374
inspect how it is mitigated by an honest node i. Adopting the 375
proposed scheme, all of the observations that i makes from j in 376
the PU-Present context are agreements and all of the observa- 377
tions in the PU-Absent context are conflicts. Therefore, node i 378
perceives that node j seems to be non-malicious in PU-Present 379
context and appears to be malicious in the PU-Absent context. 380
Since all of the observations corresponding to the PU-Absent 381
context are conflicts, the PU-Absent context trust score is zero. 382
Node i assigns the minimum of the PU-Absent and PU-Present 383
scores, which is zero, to j. As a result, node i correctly de- 384
tects the malicious behavior of j and neutralizes its effect. Thus, 385
separating the observations based on the context is necessary 386
to detect the attackers. As we showed before in Fig. 2, for the 387
same example, the c ntext-oblivious schemes are vulnerable 388
and ineffective. 389
Note that, non-malicious SUs may make honest mistakes 390
and conjecture the context incorrectly due to shadow fading or 391
noise (e.g., see simulation results for non-cooperative scenario 392
in Section VII) which in turn results in an incorrect observation 393
from a peer node. However, the properties of our proposed trust 394
scheme helps the honest SUs to gain trust from one another and 395
to be able to cooperate to correctly conjecture the context at each 396
sensing round. The facilitating properties include evaluation of 397
trust based on averaging over vectors of observations rather than 398
an instantaneous observation and also the zero trust initialization 399
strategy. In addition, since we take a conservative strategy for 400
trust assignment, in case of incorrect context establishment, the 401
malicious SUs cannot gain high trust. We consider these honest 402
mistakes in our theoretical analysis in Section V and in our 403
simulations. Our simulation results presented in Sections VI 404
and VII confirm that the proposed context-aware trust scheme 405
with conservative score assignment is significantly more stable 406
than context-oblivious trust scheme in all of the experimented 407
scenarios. 408
A. Length of the Trust Observation Vector 409
Since non-malicious nodes make honest errors, instantaneous 410
observations are not sufficient; thus, as described above, the 411
nodes must make several observations from each other and store 412
them in vectors and rely on the average scores. The honest nodes 413
experience different shadowing and noise levels during time 414
and as they move; therefore, for a sufficiently long observation 415
vector, the average trust scores are more reliable. The shadowing 416
characteristic (decorrelation distance or size of the shadows) 417
and also the mobility characteristics determine the minimum 418
required length of the observation vectors. For example, if the 419
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shadows are too large or if the nodes move very slowly, a longer420
vector may be needed for better trust evaluations between the421
nodes so that the effect of shadowing can be filtered out. On the422
other hand, shorter vectors may be preferred in dynamic attack423
scenarios to achieve fast trust update response to changes in424
nodes’ behavior.425
In conclusion, the length of the observation vectors must be426
determined considering the above trade-offs and the character-427
istics of the system. For example, as will be described later in428
Section VI, for our particular simulation setup, we found that the429
observation vector length of 8 is sufficient. As discussed before,430
adopting the zero trust initialization strategy, each SU initially431
does not trust any of the other nodes in the network. An SU432
can assign a non-zero trust score to another SU as soon as the433
observation vectors are of length 8 and some of the observations434
are agreements. However, the trust score of the malicious SUs435
will remain low because at least in one of the two contexts the436
conflict rate between the honest node and the attackers is high.437
The honest nodes then cooperate with their trusted peers to make438
more accurate final decisions that set the context for the future439
trust evaluations.440
B. Mutual Trust Between Two Honest Nodes441
As mentioned before, the honest nodes may make non-442
malicious mistakes due to fading and noise; therefore, two hon-443
est nodes may not agree in their spectrum sensing decisions in a444
sensing round. In the case of a disagreement between two honest445
nodes, both of the nodes will decrease the trust score assigned446
to the other node. Decreasing the score of a non-malicious node447
that is highly unreliable and reports incorrect data to its neigh-448
bors is desired. Such a scenario occurs if there are a subset of449
honest nodes in the network that experience higher noise or are450
located in deep shadows and moving very slowly or not moving451
out of shadow at all. However, in a mobile network, where on452
average all of the nodes experience the same level of noise and453
shadowing and have similar mobility characteristics, the aver-454
age error rates are the same for all of the peer non-malicious455
nodes.456
Therefore, the disagreement between two non-malicious457
nodes is transient. As discussed before, the trust evaluation458
based on averaging over a vector of observations filters out459
these transient mistakes. As a result, over a sufficient number460
of observations made in both PU-Present and PU-Absent co-461
ntexts every two normal honest nodes agree with each other462
more than they disagree. As an example for transient distrust463
between two honest nodes, consider an honest node i that is464
located in a shadow area for a while and thus it incorrectly de-465
creases the trust score of an honest neighbor j since they disagree466
in the PU-Absent context. However, the distrust is transient be-467
cause as soon as node i moves out of shadow, the two nodes468
start to agree with each other in the PU-Absent context and i469
increases the assigned trust score to j.470
Certainly, there is an inevitable delay associated with the471
transient effect of the mutual distrust of the honest nodes and472
this delay will impact the resulting performance negatively.473
Nevertheless, this is essentially the cost that we pay for trust474
management to prevent the risk of potential attacks and to miti- 475
gate the malicious behavior in the cooperation. As we will show 476
in our analysis and experiments, this negative effect is highly 477
dominated by the positive impact of the trust scheme in detecting 478
and excluding the malicious nodes. 479
Note that, although we do not explicitly present the mutual 480
trust scores between the honest SUs in the simulation results, 481
in all of our experiments honest nodes do assign trust scores to 482
each other; thus, the presented missed-detection and false alarm 483
rates do include in them the degradation due to the transient 484
distrust. We refer the interested reader to a detailed theoretical 485
analysis and experimental results of the honest-to-honest trust 486
which we have presented in [9, Ch. 6]. 487
V. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF CONTEXT-AWARE VERSUS 488
CONTEXT-OBLIVIOUS TRUST 489
As described in Section IV, a trust score that a node k1 as- 490
signs to another node k2 (denoted by θk1,k2 ) is a measure of the 491
probability of node k2 being honest in the view of k1. Node k1 492
continuously makes observations from k2 and the trust score is 493
calculated based on the fraction of observations that are agree- 494
ments. Therefore, the trust score essentially approximates the 495
agreement probability in the most recent set of interactions be- 496
tween the two nodes. In this section, we analyze the agreement 497
probability between the honest nodes and the malicious nodes 498
for both the context-oblivious and the proposed context-aware 499
trust schemes. 500
A. Context-Oblivious Trust Management 501
In a context-oblivious trust scheme, node k1 stores its obser- 502
vations from node k2 in a single observation vector Ok1,k2 . The 503
event of a node k1 making an observation of node k2 may occur 504
in two conditions: while PU is absent (H0 is true), and while PU 505
is present (H1 is true). Therefore the probability of k1 agreeing 506
with k2 can be written as: 507
Pr(agreek1,k2) = Pr(agreek1,k2 |H0)Pr(H0)
+ Pr(agreek1,k2 |H1)Pr(H1) (7)
From (7), we can see that if the length of the observation vector 508
is short relative to the PU activity period, then depending on 509
whether H0 or H1 is true, one of the two components in (7) be- 510
comes dominant. For example, when PU is absent for a while, 511
all or most of the observations in the observation vector may be 512
from this recent PU inactive cycle and therefore the agreement 513
between the two nodes (and consequently the trust scores) are 514
affected almost only by the probability component correspond- 515
ing to H0. If the observation vector is much longer than the 516
period of the PU activity, then on average both probability com- 517
ponents corresponding to H0 and H1 will have similar effect in 518
the trust score. 519
In the following paragraphs, we analyze the probability that 520
an honest node h1 agrees with a fabricating, Always-Yes or 521
Always-No attacker. The trust scores that the honest nodes as- 522
sign to their peers are essentially measured approximations of 523
the agreement probabilities. 524
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1) Agreement Between Honest and Fabricating: A fabricat-525
ing attacker always reports the opposite of the truth about the526
PU activity. Therefore, when an honest node h1 makes an obser-527
vation from a fabricating attacker f1, there are two conditions528
in which the two nodes agree: 1) when H0 is true and h1 makes529
a false alarm error, 2) if H1 is true and h1 makes a missed-530
detection error. Equation (8) shows the agreement probability531
between the two nodes:532
Pr(agreeh1,f1) = Pr(Fh1)Pr(H0) + Pr(Mh1)Pr(H1) (8)
where, Pr(Fk ) and Pr(Mk ) of a node k denote the probability533
of false alarm and missed-detection of node k, respectively. If534
the cooperative decisions of the honest nodes have very low false535
alarm and missed-detection rates, the agreement rate with the536
fabricating attacker will be very small as well, thus the assigned537
trust scores will be small. However, when honest nodes make538
honest mistakes either in the presence or absence of the PU, in539
both cases they incorrectly agree with the fabricating attackers540
and as a result their associated trust scores are increased. For541
example if PU stays inactive for a while and the honest nodes542
make many false alarm errors, most of the observations in the543
observation vector Oh1f1 are made in H0 and the probability544
of agreement is essentially close to Pr(Fh1) which is high. As545
a result, when PU finally becomes active, initially, the highly546
trusted fabricating attackers can significantly affect the detection547
performance in this cycle.548
Therefore, when the context-oblivious strategy is employed,549
if either missed-detection or false alarm rate of the honest nodes550
is high, due to deep shadow or high noise, the trust score of fab-551
ricating attackers will be increased. We will discuss and show552
in our simulation results in the next sections that the incorrect553
increase in trust score of fabricating attackers due to honest mis-554
takes has a destructive effect on the PU detection performance.555
In contrast, as shown later, the proposed context-aware trust556
scheme alleviates this problem by considering separate contexts557
of observations and taking the worst case (the minimum agree-558
ment among the two contexts.)559
2) Agreement Between Honest and Always-Yes: An Always-560
Yes attacker always broadcasts reports that indicate the presence561
of the PU. Therefore, an honest node h1 agrees with an Always-562
Yes attacker, y1, in the following cases: 1) if H0 is true and node563
h1 makes a false alarm, 2) if H1 is true and h1 does not make a564
missed-detection error and actually decides that PU is present.565
Equation (9) derives the agreement probability:566
Pr(agreeh1,y1) = Pr(Fh1)Pr(H0) + Pr(Mh1)Pr(H1) (9)
Obviously, when H1 is true, an Always-Yes attacker’s report is567
indeed correct. Therefore, adopting this context-oblivious trust568
management scheme, an honest node will incorrectly increase569
the trust score of an Always-Yes attacker even when the hon-570
est node has low error rate (in this case when the honest node571
does not make missed-detection errors). As we show later, this572
shortcoming of the context-oblivious trust management is sig-573
nificant and results in the inability of the trust scheme to mitigate574
Always-Yes attacks.575
3) Agreement Between Honest and Always-No: Similarly,576
(10) derives the agreement probability between an honest node,577
h1, and an Always-No attacker, n1 : 578
Pr(agreeh1,n1) = Pr(Fh1)Pr(H0) + Pr(Mh1)Pr(H1)
(10)
Therefore, an honest node (with a low false alarm rate) in- 579
creases the trust score of an Always-No attacker when PU is 580
absent. This makes the context-oblivious trust scheme vulnera- 581
ble to Always-No attacks. 582
B. The Proposed Context-Aware Trust Management Scheme 583
As described in Section IV, the proposed context-aware trust 584
scheme separates the observations from each node to two con- 585
texts, PU-Absent and PU-Present. For both contexts, the event 586
of a node k1 making an observation of another node k2 may oc- 587
cur either when H0 is true or when H1 is true. The context is set 588
by k1’s cooperative final decision which is its best estimate of 589
the PU activity; therefore, “Absent observations” are not neces- 590
sarily made while H0 is true and “Present observations” are not 591
necessarily made while H1 is true. In this section, we analyze 592
the agreement probability in both PU-Absent and PU-Present 593
contexts to understand the trust scores corresponding to each of 594
these contexts. 595
When a node k1 makes a cooperative final decision to set the 596
context for its observations, one of the following four events 597
occurs: 598
1) BA0 : H0 is true and the final decision is PU-Absent. 599
Pr(BA0 ) = Pr(H0)Pr(Fk1) 600
2) BP0 : H0 is true and the final decision is PU-Present. 601
Pr(BP0 ) = Pr(H0)Pr(Fk1) 602
3) BA1 : H1 is true and the final decision is PU-Absent. 603
Pr(BA1 ) = Pr(H1)Pr(Mk1) 604
4) BP1 : H1 is true and the final decision is PU-Present. 605
Pr(BP1 ) = Pr(H1)Pr(Mk1) 606
Obviously, BP0 and BA1 occur when the node makes a false 607
alarm and missed-detection error, respectively. In contrast, in 608
the events BA0 and BP1 , the node is not in error. We denote the 609
event where the context is set to PU-Absent by BA , which is 610
the union of the events BA0 and BA1 . Therefore, the probability 611
of BA can be derived as follows: 612
Pr(BA ) = Pr(BA0 ) + Pr(B
A
1 )
= Pr(H0)Pr(Fk1) + Pr(H1)Pr(Mk1) (11)
Similarly, we denote the event where the context is set to PU- 613
Present by BP , which is the union of the events BP0 and BP1 . 614
Therefore, we have: 615
Pr(BP ) = Pr(BP0 ) + Pr(B
P
1 )
= Pr(H0)Pr(Fk1) + Pr(H1)Pr(Mk1) (12)
For a node k1, we can derive the following conditional 616
probabilities: 617
Pr(BA0 |BA ) =
Pr(H0)Pr(Fk1)
Pr(H0)Pr(Fk1) + Pr(H1)Pr(Mk1)
(13)
Pr(BA1 |BA ) =
Pr(H1)Pr(Mk1)
Pr(H0)Pr(Fk1) + Pr(H1)Pr(Mk1)
(14)
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618
Pr(BP0 |BP ) =
Pr(H0)Pr(Fk1)
Pr(H0)Pr(Fk1) + Pr(H1)Pr(Mk1)
(15)
Pr(BP1 |BP ) =
Pr(H1)Pr(Mk1)
Pr(H0)Pr(Fk1) + Pr(H1)Pr(Mk1)
(16)
We denote the probability of node k1 agreeing with node619
k2 in the PU-Absent context and PU-Present context by620
Pr(agreeAk1,k2) and Pr(agree
P
k1,k2
), respectively. These prob-621
abilities are written in (17) and (18), respectively.622
Pr(agreeAk1,k2) =
Pr(agreek1,k2 |BA ) = Pr(agreek1,k2 |BA0 )Pr(BA0 |BA )
+ Pr(agreek1,k2 |BA1 )Pr(BA1 |BA )
(17)
Pr(agreePk1,k2) =
Pr(agreek1,k2 |BP ) = Pr(agreek1,k2 |BP0 )Pr(BP0 |BP )
+ Pr(agreek1,k2 |BP1 )Pr(BP1 |BP )
(18)
1) Agreement Between Honest and Fabricating:623
a) PU-absent context: When honest node h1’s final deci-624
sion (and thus the context) is PU-Absent, it records its obser-625
vation from a fabricating node f1 in the “Absent observation626
vector”, OAh1,f1 . In this context, if H0 is true (the ground truth627
is that PU is absent), the two nodes definitely disagree since the628
fabricating node’s report indicates that PU is active. On the other629
hand, if H1 is true, then the two nodes definitely agree, because630
the fabricating node’s report indicates that PU is inactive in this631
case. Therefore we have the following:632
Pr(agreeh1,f1 |BA0 ) = 0
Pr(agreeh1,f1 |BA1 ) = 1 (19)
As a result by replacement in (17), the probability of agreement633
in the PU-Absent context is equal to the probability that h1 sets634
the context to PU-Absent while the PU is present which means635
h1 must make a missed-detection error. Using (14), we have the636
following:637
Pr(agreeAh1,f1) = Pr(B
A
1 |BA )
=
Pr(H1)Pr(Mh1)
Pr(H0)Pr(Fh1) + Pr(H1)Pr(Mh1)
(20)
b) PU-present context: When honest node h1’s final de-638
cision (and thus the context) is PU-Present, it records its obser-639
vation from a fabricating node f1 in the “Present observation640
vector”, OPh1,f1 . In this context, if H0 is true, the two nodes641
definitely agree since the fabricating node reports that PU is642
active. On the other hand, if H1 is true, the two nodes definitely643
disagree. Therefore we have the following:644
Pr(agreeh1,f1 |BP0 ) = 1
Pr(agreeh1,f1 |BP1 ) = 0 (21)
By replacement in (18), the probability of agreement in the 645
PU-Present context is equal to the probability that h1 sets the 646
context to PU-Present while the PU is absent which means h1 647
must make a false alarm error. Using (15), we have: 648
Pr(agreePh1,f1) = Pr(B
P
0 |BP )
=
Pr(H0)Pr(Fh1)
Pr(H0)Pr(Fh1) + Pr(H1)Pr(Mh1)
(22)
The trust score that node h1 assigns to fabricating node f1 is 649
then calculated based on the minimum of the scores derived 650
from the two observation vectors (contexts) as described above 651
(minimum of (20) and (22)). 652
2) Agreement Between Honest and Always-Yes: An Always- 653
Yes attacker, y1, always reports to an honest node h1 that PU 654
is active. Therefore, whenever h1’s final decision is PU-Absent, 655
the observation from y1 is definitely a conflict (probability of 656
agreement is zero) and is recorded in the “Absent observation 657
vector”. Note that, the agreement rate is exactly zero regardless 658
of whether h1 sets the context to PU-Absent by mistake (i.e., 659
regardless of the ground truth of the PU activity.) Conversely, 660
whenever h1’s final decision is PU-Present, the observation from 661
y1 is definitely an agreement (probability of agreement is one) 662
and is recorded in the “Present observation vector”. As a result, 663
adopting the context-aware trust, an honest node always assigns 664
the minimum trust score which is zero to an Always-Yes attacker 665
and thus can successfully exclude it: 666
Pr(agreeAh1,y1) = 0
Pr(agreePh1,y1) = 1
min(Pr(agreeAh1,y1), P r(agree
P
h1,y1
)) = 0 (23)
3) Agreement Between Honest and Always-No: An Always- 667
No attacker, n1, always indicates that PU is inactive to an 668
honest node h1. Therefore, whenever h1’s final decision is 669
PU-Absent, the observation from y1 is definitely an agreement 670
and is recorded in the “Absent observation vector”. Whenever 671
h1’s final decision is PU-Present, the observation from y1 is 672
definitely a conflict and is recorded in the “Present observation 673
vector”. Taking the minimum, an honest node always assigns 674
a zero trust score to an Always-No attacker, which means the 675
honest node can successfully exclude the attacker: 676
Pr(agreeAh1,n1) = 1
Pr(agreePh1,n1) = 0
min(Pr(agreeAh1,n1), P r(agree
P
h1,n1
)) = 0 (24)
In the next section, we evaluate the probability of agreement 677
between an honest node and an attacker (different types) with 678
simulations in realistic settings. We will show that in all of the 679
simulation scenarios under different types of attacks, adopting 680
the context-aware trust scheme significantly reduces the effect 681
of the attackers by assigning the lowest trust scores to them. 682
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TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS FOR EVALUATING TRUST-AWARE DCSS
Path Loss and Shadow Fading Random Way Point Model
PU Dist. from CRAHN 15 km CRAHN Area 200 m × 200 m
PU Antenna Height 30 m Min Velocity 1 m/s
SU Antenna Height 1 m Max Velocity 2 m/s
Center Freq. 615 MHz Min Pause 60 s
Log-normal Shadowing 8 dB Max Pause 120 s
SD (σψ dB )
Decorrelation Dist. (Xc ) 50 m
Transmit Power (PT ) 54 dBm
Noise and Threshold Monte Carlo Simulation
Noise Figure 11 dB # SU Nodes 25
Channel Bandwidth 6 MHz # Consensus Iter. 4
Noise Power (PN ) −95.22 dBm SU Node Range 80 m
Threshold (γ) [−96, −80] dBm Simulation Time 8000 s
Sense Interval 2 s
PU activity period 800 s
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS683
In this section, we present the results of our Monte Carlo sim-684
ulations to evaluate the performance of our proposed context-685
aware trust scheme in mitigating the effect of different types of686
attackers. Table I describes our simulation setup. We consider a687
network of 25 SU nodes that are mobile in a 200 m × 200 m688
square location area. Each SU node can communicate with any689
of the other SU nodes located within its 80 m radius. We make690
the assumption that the sensing frequency of the SUs in the net-691
work is much faster than the PU activity frequency: Each SU692
senses the spectrum every 2 seconds (as recommended in IEEE693
802.22 [36]) and the PU’s period of activity is 800 seconds with694
a 50% duty cycle, which means the PU is active for 400 seconds695
and inactive for 400 seconds periodically. Each Monte Carlo696
simulation employs a different and randomly generated shadow697
fading map and it spans 8000 seconds during which the SUs are698
mobile. In each sensing round, the number of consensus iter-699
ations is 4 (See (4): the iterative update.) From the simulation700
parameters, it can be derived that at any point of time each of701
the 25 SUs in the network has 11 neighbors on average (for702
uniformly distributed nodes in the square location area.) Since703
the nodes are moving in the area, their neighborhoods are con-704
stantly changing. The presented results in this section in terms705
of false alarm and missed-detection performance are averaged706
over 10000 Monte Carlo runs to ensure sufficient randomness707
is captured.708
As explained in Section IV-A, the minimum required length709
for the observation vector is determined by the characteristics710
of the system. According to our experimental results, the length711
of 8 is sufficient for our system setup and thus we have fixed712
Omin = 8 in our experiments that are presented in this section713
(no considerable performance improvement was observed using714
larger observation vector lengths 16 and 32). The length of715
the observation vector, 8, is small compared to the period of716
the PU activity. In addition, for this fixed observation vector717
length, we experimented with smaller PU activity period of718
80 s and 8 s and no noticeable difference has been observed in719
the performance of our proposed context-aware trust scheme.720
Zero trust initialization is used in all of the experiments unless 721
otherwise stated. 722
A. Mitigating Always-Yes Attack 723
Fig. 5 presents the average false alarm and missed-detection 724
rates from Monte Carlo simulations in a scenario where 20% of 725
the SUs are Always-Yes attackers. The figure also depicts the 726
agreement probability between an honest SU and an Always- 727
Yes attacker based on the analysis in Sections V-A and V-B and 728
using average false alarm and missed-detection rates that are 729
measured from the simulations. 730
Fig. 5(a) and (b) show the results corresponding to 731
the context-oblivious and the proposed context-aware trust 732
schemes, respectively. The context-oblivious scheme incor- 733
rectly assigns high trust scores to the Always-Yes attackers, 734
since in the PU active cycles, the honest SUs agree with the 735
Always-Yes nodes. In addition, for low detection thresholds, 736
where the false alarm rate of the honest SUs is high, they 737
agree with the Always-Yes attackers even in the PU inactive 738
cycles. The agreement with Always-Yes attackers decreases as 739
the threshold increases and false alarm rate decreases. 740
On the other hand, as discussed in Section V-B2, with the pro- 741
posed context-aware scheme, an honest node is able to correctly 742
assign the trust score of 0 to an Always-Yes attacker because 743
it takes the minimum of the trust scores in the PU-Present and 744
PU-Absent contexts (See (23).) In Fig. 5(b) only the minimum 745
of the two agreement probabilities is shown which is 0. Thus, as 746
seen from the figure, the proposed scheme effectively mitigates 747
the attack and the false alarm rate sharply drops for the detection 748
thresholds above the average noise power (vertical black dashed 749
line at -95.22 dBm.) Thus, in terms of false alarm error rate, the 750
context-aware trust strategy performs significantly better than 751
the context-oblivious trust strategy. 752
In terms of missed-detection, the error rate intuitively in- 753
creases for higher detection thresholds in both the context- 754
oblivious and context-aware schemes. Since the Always-Yes 755
attackers broadcast high values regardless of the PU activ- 756
ity, the malicious behavior of these attackers is advantageous 757
when the PU is present. The reason is that the nodes in shad- 758
ows might be corrected by cooperating with the Always-Yes 759
nodes. We call this a positive side-effect of the Always-Yes 760
malicious behavior. As a result, excluding the attackers has the 761
counter-intuitive result of higher missed-detection errors. Since 762
the context-oblivious trust strategy is not as effective as 763
the context-aware scheme in mitigating Always-Yes attackers, 764
it results in better missed-detection rate as shown in Fig. 5. 765
Nevertheless, the negative effect of the Always-Yes attackers 766
is significant when PU is inactive and therefore these attackers 767
must be mitigated using the trust scheme. Receiver Operating 768
Characteristic (ROC) curves enable us to fairly evaluate our 769
proposed context-aware trust scheme as we need both of the 770
missed-detection and false alarm error rates to be as small as 771
possible at the same time for a given detection threshold. ROC 772
curves in Fig. 6 show missed-detection and false alarm error 773
rates for a range of detection thresholds (as described in Ta- 774
ble I) in two scenarios: 1) in the presence of 20% Always-Yes 775
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Fig. 5. 20% Always-Yes ISSDF attack (Vertical dashed lines: Noise power).
(a) Context-oblivious trust management. (b) Proposed context-aware trust
management.
Fig. 6. ROC performance analysis: Resilient DCSS with proposed context-
aware trust scheme mitigating Always-Yes ISSDF attack.
attackers, and 2) with no attackers. It is clear from the ROC776
plots that the proposed context-aware trust strategy is able to ef-777
fectively contain the attack and maintain the error rate close to778
the no-attack case. In conclusion, as the presented ROC curve779
reveals, our proposed scheme offers sufficiently low missed-780
detection and false alarm rates at the same time in the presence781
of Always-Yes attackers.782
B. Mitigating Always-No Attack783
Fig. 7 shows the resulting average false alarm and missed-784
detection rates of the Monte Carlo simulations for the scenario785
where 20% of the SUs conduct Always-No attacks. The figure786
Fig. 7. 20% Always-No ISSDF attack (Vertical dashed lines: Noise power).
(a) Context-oblivious trust management. (b) Proposed context-aware trust man-
agement.
Fig. 8. ROC performance analysis: Resilient DCSS with proposed context-
aware trust scheme mitigating Always-No ISSDF attack.
presents the results for both context-oblivious and our proposed 787
context-aware trust schemes. It also depicts the agreement 788
probability based on the analysis in Sections V-A and V-B and 789
using average false alarm and missed-detection rates from the 790
simulations. 791
As can be seen from the figure, in terms of missed-detection 792
error rate, the context-aware trust strategy performs better than 793
the context-oblivious trust strategy. As explained in Section V-A 794
and shown in Fig. 7(a) the context-oblivious trust incorrectly as- 795
signs high trust scores to the Always-No attackers as the agree- 796
ment probability is high in all of the PU inactive cycles. For very 797
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low thresholds, where false alarm is too high, the trust score is798
low but as the threshold increases and the false alarm rate drops,799
in a PU inactive cycle, the Always-No attackers are in agree-800
ment with the honest nodes and as the duty cycle of PU is 0.5801
their trust score approaches to 0.5. When the threshold is too802
high and the missed-detection rate starts to increase, the trust803
of the Always-No attackers increases even more because now804
the agreement between the honest nodes and the attackers also805
occurs in the PU active cycles. On the other hand, as seen from806
Fig. 7(b), with our proposed context-aware trust management,807
the honest nodes assign trust of zero to the Always-No attackers808
(See (24)) and therefore can effectively mitigate them. Similar809
to the case of the Always-Yes attack, here Always-No attackers810
have a positive side effect on the false alarm rate, meaning that811
since they broadcast low values even when PU is absent, they812
will reduce the chance of false alarms in the network. Therefore,813
in terms of false alarm rate, at very low thresholds (below the814
noise power) the context-oblivious scheme performs better than815
the context-aware scheme . Fig. 8 presents the resulting ROC816
curve for the scenario 20% Always-No attack. It is clear that the817
proposed context-aware trust management effectively mitigates818
the attackers and maintains a performance close to the no-attack819
scenario.820
C. Mitigating Fabricating Attack821
Fig. 9 compares the performance results and the agreement822
probabilities of the context-oblivious and context-aware trust823
schemes in a scenario where 20% of the SUs are fabricating824
attackers. As seen from the results, the proposed context-aware825
trust scheme is superior to the context-oblivious trust in terms826
of both false alarm and missed-detection.827
Fabricating attackers always broadcast a fabricated value that828
is the opposite of the true sensing measurement. Therefore, if829
an honest node does not make false alarm or missed-detection830
mistakes, then in both of the PU active and inactive cycles, the831
node will be in conflict with a fabricating attacker. However, if832
the honest nodes do make erroneous final decisions, then adopt-833
ing the context-oblivious trust scheme, they incorrectly increase834
the trust of the fabricating attackers (See (8) in Section V-A.)835
The honest/fabricating agreement in the context-oblivious836
scheme shown in Fig. 9(a) confirms that for both high false alarm837
rate (for low thresholds on the left) and high missed-detection838
rate (for high thresholds on the right), the honest/fabricating839
agreement is increased. As a result the context-oblivious trust840
scheme cannot mitigate the impact of the fabricating attackers841
in these cases. In high false alarm case (due to high noise), the842
trusted fabricating attackers can increase missed-detection rate843
and in high missed-detection case (due to deep shadow), the844
trusted attackers can increase false alarm rate.845
On the other hand, the proposed context-aware trust scheme,846
as shown in Fig. 9(b), picks the minimum of the trust scores as-847
sociated with “Absent observations” and “Present observations”848
to filter out the mistakenly high honest/fabricating agreements849
at the two extremes of the threshold range. As a result, a small850
trust score, close to zero is assigned to the fabricating attacker.851
The honest nodes may be unreliable either because they are852
Fig. 9. 20% Fabricating ISSDF attack (Vertical dashed lines: Noise power).
(a) Context-oblivious trust management. (b) Proposed context-aware trust
management.
Fig. 10. ROC performance analysis: Resilient DCSS with proposed context-
aware trust scheme mitigating fabricating ISSDF attack.
likely to make missed-detection errors (high detection thresh- 853
olds relative to the signal strength) or false alarm errors (low 854
thresholds relative to the noise level) but normally not both at 855
the same time. Therefore, by adopting the context-aware trust 856
strategy, the honest nodes will be able to detect the malicious 857
behavior and to update the score of the fabricating attackers cor- 858
rectly. Our proposed context-aware trust management scheme 859
is more cautious, by separating the observations in PU-Present 860
and PU-Absent contexts and picking the minimum of the two 861
scores (See (20) and (22).) The ROC curves in Fig. 10 clearly 862
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show that the context-aware trust is essential and effective in863
mitigating the attack in the case of fabricating attack as well.864
D. Discussion on the Simulation Results865
The results presented in this section for various scenarios866
reveal that by adopting the proposed context-aware scheme, the867
resultant performance is consistent across all of the three types868
of attacks. As shown in Figs. 5, 7, and 9, unlike the context-869
oblivious scheme, the context-aware scheme results in the same870
missed-detection and false alarm rates in all of the three cases871
by maintaining a trust score of zero or close to zero for the872
attackers. Similarly, the ROC plots in Figs. 6, 8, and 10, confirm873
that our scheme offers essentially the same performance for all874
of the attack cases by successfully neutralizing the attackers875
(which form 20% of the network). Therefore, the proposed trust876
scheme offers a comprehensive solution for mitigating different877
attack scenarios.878
In the next section, we continue our analysis and comparison879
with respect to different characteristics of the network including880
the attack severity, the SU network density and the distance of881
the network to the PU. In addition, we analyze the dynamic882
range of the detection threshold in different scenarios to satisfy883
a desired performance in the presence of attackers.884
VII. COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS885
A. Mitigating Attacks of Different Severity Levels886
In Fig. 11 we analyze a few examples of simulation runs that887
show the progress over time of the average of the trust scores that888
the honest nodes in the network assign to one typical Always-889
Yes attacker. For this particular simulation, we have fixed the890
detection threshold to -93 dBm, a middle threshold where the891
average error rates for the honest nodes is not at high rates (at892
this threshold, the measured average probabilities of false alarm893
and missed-detection for an individual honest node are 0.0007894
and 0.0276, respectively.)895
The simulation spans 4000 sensing rounds (8000 s) and dur-896
ing this time the nodes are mobile. The shown plots have one897
data point per 50 s. For this set of experiments, we enforced898
an initial trust score of 0.5 for all of the nodes (rather than ini-899
tializing to zero) in order to show how the honest nodes are900
able to reduce the trust of an attacker from 0.5 to zero and to901
maintain the zero trust. Fig. 11(a) shows the results where 20%902
of the nodes are attackers. As expected, in the context-oblivious903
trust scheme, the trust of the Always-Yes attacker is increased904
whenever PU is active. The randomness of the trust score is905
due to the mobility of the nodes and the changes in the neigh-906
borhoods; nevertheless, the increase in the trust score in active907
cycles (shaded areas) is clearly seen. As mentioned before, this908
is the reason why the context-oblivious trust is not effective in909
mitigating the attackers.910
Note that, with the context-oblivious scheme, the assigned911
trust to the Always-Yes attacker remains high in most of the912
inactive cycles (white areas) showing only a small decrease.913
This clearly shows that once the ISSDF Always-Yes attackers914
in the network gained increased trust (in the active cycles), they915
Fig. 11. Average trust score of the honest nodes assigned to a typical Always-
Yes attacker. Trust scores initialized to 0.5. Detection threshold = −93 dBm.
(a) 20% Always-Yes ISSDF attackers. (b) Different severities of Always-Yes
ISSDF attack.
Fig. 12. ROC performance analysis: The proposed resilient DCSS scheme
with context-aware trust under various Always-Yes ISSDF attack severity.
strongly affect the final decisions of the honest nodes in the 916
inactive cycles. Since the honest nodes mistakenly decide PU 917
is active, the Always-Yes attackers appear to be in agreement 918
with the honest nodes which in turn makes the honest nodes 919
believe the attackers are trustworthy. As a result, the trust as- 920
sociated with the attacker is hardly decreased. In contrast, the 921
proposed context-aware trust scheme, successfully reduces the 922
trust of the Always-Yes attacker from the initial trust score 923
down to 0 and keeps it low and therefore effectively excludes 924
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the malicious node. Fig. 11(b) compares the trust progress in925
different attack severity scenarios. All of the attackers in the926
network are of the same type (i.e., Always-Yes) and thus they927
strengthen each other’s effect. As seen in the plot, the proposed928
context-aware trust successfully reduces the trust score of the929
attacker to zero even when the majority of the nodes are attack-930
ers (60%). The Always-Yes attackers initially have a trust score931
of 0.5 in the viewpoint of all of the honest nodes in the network.932
As the honest nodes observe these attackers, they fill up their933
observation vectors corresponding to both the PU-Absent and934
PU-Present contexts. As soon as the number of observations935
in a vector reaches the predefined minimum (8 observations),936
the trust score that is calculated based on these observations (5)937
replaces the initial 0.5 score.938
As described in the previous section, whenever the final de-939
cision of an honest node is PU-Absent, its observation from an940
Always-Yes attacker will be a conflict. Therefore, as soon as 8941
PU-Absent observations are made from an Always-Yes attacker,942
the score corresponding to PU-Absent context will be zero and943
thus the honest node assigns the smaller trust score of the two944
contexts (which is zero) to the attacker (See (23).) Although in945
our experiment, the PU is absent half of the time, initially due to946
the effect of the Always-Yes attackers (with initial trust scores of947
0.5), the honest nodes are misled to decide that the PU is present948
most of the time. As a result, the PU-Absent observation vec-949
tors of an honest node get filled-up (i.e. reaches 8 observations)950
in a longer period of time compared with a no-attack scenario.951
The more severe the attack is, the attackers are initially more952
effective and it takes the honest nodes a longer time and a larger953
number of observations to fill their PU-Absent vectors. As a re-954
sult, for more severe attacks, the convergence of the trust score955
towards zero takes a longer time. However, as seen in Fig. 11(b)956
in all of the attack scenarios including the most severe ones,957
eventually, the trust is reduced to zero. Therefore, the attackers958
are completely neutralized.959
Fig. 12 shows the ROC results of Monte Carlo simulations960
of Always-Yes attack scenarios of different severity levels.961
This figure is an extension to the previously shown Fig. 6,962
where only 20% attack was considered. The simulation setup is963
the same as the setup described in Section VI (thus, adopting the964
zero trust initialization strategy.) The proposed scheme success-965
fully mitigates the attacks in all of the scenarios including the966
case where the majority of the SUs are malicious. For compari-967
son, we also show ROC of the non-cooperative case where the968
SU nodes make decisions independently without cooperation.969
Thus, in the non-cooperative scenario, the SU nodes are greatly970
affected by shadow fading and noise but they are not affected by971
ISSDF attackers. By utilizing the context-aware trust scheme,972
even under the most severe attack (i.e. 60% of the network),973
the resulting performance of the cooperative spectrum sensing974
is significantly better than the non-cooperative scenario. There-975
fore, the trust scheme successfully restricts the destructive effect976
of the attackers on the cooperation.977
As shown before, the performance of the proposed trust978
scheme is consistent across different types of attacks. Similar979
results for attack severity scalability are achieved for Always-980
No and fabricating attacks. These results show that our proposed981
Fig. 13. Range of detection thresholds to realize desired operating regions
in terms of PM D and PF A . (a) Under 20% Always-Yes attack: With context-
oblivious trust. (b) Under 20% Always-Yes attack: With context-aware trust.
(c) No attack.
trust scheme is able to alleviate various attacks of different sever- 982
ity levels, thus, it provides an effective defense system against 983
ISSDF for a wide variety of realistic scenarios. 984
B. Enhanced Detection Threshold Dynamic Range 985
Fig. 13 compares the ranges of the detection thresholds that 986
satisfy different operating regions in terms of missed-detection 987
and false alarm rates for different scenarios. Under 20% Always- 988
Yes attack, the context-aware trust helps to maintain the dynamic 989
range of the detection threshold to approach to the honest case. 990
In contrast, using the context-oblivious trust scheme, the attack 991
affects the network significantly; as a result, regardless of the 992
detection threshold, none of the operating regions, not even 993
the most relaxed one (10−1 error rate) can be achieved. The 994
presented results confirm the significance of the proposed trust 995
scheme in enhancing the flexibility and relaxing the sensitivity 996
requirements of the cognitive radio devices. 997
C. Scalability of the Proposed Trust Scheme 998
In this section, we analyze the scalability of the proposed 999
context-aware trust scheme for DCSS in terms of SU network 1000
density and distance of the SU network from the PU transmit- 1001
ter. Fig. 14(a) shows the performance results for variable net- 1002
work density for a fixed detection threshold of −94 dBm where 1003
20% of the nodes are fabricating attackers. In all of our experi- 1004
ments in the previous sections, we considered 25 SU nodes in a 1005
200 m× 200 m location area (i.e., density of 625 SUs per km2). 1006
In Fig. 14(a), however, the number of SU nodes is varied from 1007
only 5 nodes up to 50 nodes in the same area size which results 1008
in a density of 125 up to 1250 SUs per km2. Therefore, we 1009
consider a variety of scenarios from a sparse to a dense SU net- 1010
work. In this set of simulations we use the same setup (e.g. PU 1011
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Fig. 14. Scalability analysis in terms of (a) SU network density and (b)
distance from PU. Attack scenario: 20% fabricating attackers. Detection
threshold = −94 dBm.
activity, SU mobility, 15 km distance from the PU transmitter)1012
as described in Table I.1013
For a higher SU network density, there are more nodes in1014
the neighborhoods and in general there is more diversity in the1015
network that can be exploited by cooperation. As a result, both1016
PM D and PF A should improve when the density of the network1017
is increased. However, at the same time, in a denser network,1018
the attackers get greater opportunity to propagate their falsified1019
values in the network if they are not properly contained by the1020
trust management scheme. The results presented in Fig. 14(a)1021
shows that using the context-oblivious trust, the false alarm rate1022
of the 375 SUs/km2 case is higher than that of the 125 SUs/km21023
case. For denser networks, then the error rates decrease, but1024
both false alarm and missed-detection rates remain relatively1025
high even in the densest case. This confirms that the attackers1026
are not mitigated adequately by the context-oblivious scheme.1027
In contrast, our proposed context-aware trust scheme limits1028
the impact of the attackers and therefore, increasing the den-1029
sity of the nodes is beneficial as the diversity is increased. In1030
conclusion, our proposed trust-aware DCSS scheme scales well1031
with the network density and performs notably better than the1032
context-oblivious trust regardless of the network density. In fact,1033
as it is clear from Fig. 14(a), the gap between the proposed1034
scheme and the contexts-oblivious scheme becomes more sig-1035
nificant for denser networks.1036
In Fig. 14(b), we analyze the scalability in terms of the dis-1037
tance between the SU network of 25 nodes and the PU trans-1038
mitter. Increasing the PU distance results in a decrease in the 1039
average received signal to noise ratio by the SU nodes, there- 1040
fore, the missed-detection rate increases with distance as shown 1041
in Fig. 14(b). Note that the false alarm rate depends on the noise 1042
level and not the signal strength, thus not shown. The results 1043
show that the proposed context-aware trust scheme performs 1044
significantly better than the context-oblivious scheme, regard- 1045
less of the distance. 1046
VIII. CONCLUSION 1047
We present a novel context-aware trust management scheme 1048
that is integrated into distributed cooperative spectrum sens- 1049
ing and is shown to significantly increase the resilience of the 1050
distributed cooperation to insistent spectrum sensing data falsi- 1051
fication (ISSDF) attacks. Unlike the existing trust schemes, the 1052
proposed method enables the secondary users to perform more 1053
informed trust evaluations of their peers based on the context 1054
(whether the primary user is absent or present.) As a result our 1055
trust scheme is effective in mitigating the attackers in realis- 1056
tic dynamic scenarios where the primary user of the channel 1057
frequently transitions between active and inactive. We evalu- 1058
ate our proposed trust management scheme under Always-Yes, 1059
Always-No, and fabricating ISSDF attacks via both theoretical 1060
analysis and extensive Monte Carlo simulations. We developed 1061
a realistic model where the mobile cognitive radio ad hoc net- 1062
work operates in TV white space and the primary user transmit- 1063
ter’s activity is changing over time. We show the scalability of 1064
the proposed scheme in terms of attack severity, network density 1065
and the distance of the secondary network from the primary user 1066
transmitter. Furthermore, the dynamic range of the sensitivity 1067
of the cognitive radios is shown to be considerably improved, 1068
benefiting from the proposed context-aware trust scheme. 1069
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A Context-Aware Trust Framework for Resilient
Distributed Cooperative Spectrum Sensing
in Dynamic Settings
1
2
3
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Abstract—Cognitive radios enable dynamic spectrum access5
where secondary users (SUs) are allowed to operate on the licensed6
spectrum bands on an opportunistic noninterference basis. Coop-7
eration among the SUs for spectrum sensing is essential for environ-8
ments with deep shadows. In this paper, we study the adverse effect9
of insistent spectrum sensing data falsification (ISSDF) attack on10
iterative distributed cooperative spectrum sensing. We show that11
the existing trust management schemes are not adequate in miti-12
gating ISSDF attacks in dynamic settings where the primary user13
(PU) of the band frequently transitions between active and inactive14
states. We propose a novel context-aware distributed trust frame-15
work for cooperative spectrum sensing in mobile cognitive radio ad16
hoc networks (CRAHN) that effectively alleviates different types17
of ISSDF attacks (Always-Yes, Always-No, and fabricating) in dy-18
namic scenarios. In the proposed framework, the SU nodes evaluate19
the trustworthiness of one another based on the two possible con-20
texts in which they make observations from each other: PU absent21
context and PU present context. We evaluate the proposed context-22
aware scheme and compare it against the existing context-oblivious23
trust schemes using theoretical analysis and extensive simulations24
of realistic scenarios of mobile CRAHNs operating in TV white25
space. We show that in the presence of a large set of attackers26
(as high as 60% of the network), the proposed context-aware trust27
scheme successfully mitigates the attacks and satisfy the false alarm28
and missed-detection rates of 10−2 and lower. Moreover, we show29
that the proposed scheme is scalable in terms of attack severity,30
SU network density, and the distance of the SU network to the PU31
transmitter.32
Index Terms—Cognitive radio, context awareness, cooperative33
systems, mobile ad hoc networks, network security, radio spectrum34
management, wireless networks.35
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I. INTRODUCTION 36
THE dynamic spectrum access (DSA) paradigm, en- 37abled by cognitive radios, facilitates flexible and efficient 38
spectrum usage by allowing secondary users (SUs) to use li- 39
censed spectrum bands of primary users (PUs) on an opportunis- 40
tic non-interference basis [1]. The SUs must perform spectrum 41
sensing in order to avoid interference with the PUs. Coopera- 42
tive spectrum sensing (CSS) that exploits the spatial diversity 43
in the SU network effectively relaxes the sensitivity require- 44
ments on individual SUs and improves the overall sensing per- 45
formance [2]. Distributed cooperative spectrum sensing (DCSS) 46
is preferred to a centralized scheme (with a fusion center) as it 47
is scalable, fault-tolerant and more efficient [3]. DCSS also en- 48
ables cooperative sensing in cognitive radio ad hoc networks 49
(CRAHN) where there is no base station or infrastructure. The 50
existing DCSS schemes which are inspired by distributed aver- 51
age consensus algorithms are based on iterative diffusion and ag- 52
gregation of data through linear iteration-based or gossip-based 53
schemes and involve communication with direct neighbors in 54
the network graph [4]–[6]. 55
Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification (SSDF) [7] is a known 56
attack for cooperative spectrum sensing schemes, where mali- 57
cious SUs broadcast falsified sensing data to their neighbors in 58
order to mislead them and compromise the spectrum sharing in 59
the cognitive radio network. SSDF attack can cause the SUs to 60
make incorrect decisions about the PU activity which will result 61
in increased interference from the SUs to the PU and will also 62
lead to underutilization of the free spectrum. Insistent SSDF 63
(ISSDF) attack [8], [9], in particular, is aimed at iterative DCSS 64
schemes where the attacker not only falsifies its sensing data 65
but it also broadcasts the falsified value in every iteration of the 66
cooperation and refrains from updating its value according to 67
the iterative protocol. Thus, ISSDF attacks can be very harmful. 68
Fig. 1 depicts the behavior of three main types of attackers that 69
have been considered for CSS namely fabricating, Always-Yes, 70
and Always-No [10], [11]. Always-Yes and Always-No attack- 71
ers constantly broadcast high and low power values as their 72
sensing reports, respectively, regardless of the PU activity state. 73
In contrast, a fabricating attacker generates a falsified low or 74
high value indicating the opposite of the true PU activity state. 75
Distributed trust schemes have been recently introduced for 76
DCSS that require each SU node to maintain a single sliding 77
observation vector per each SU [12], [13]. Whenever an SU 78
node i receives a value from another node j, node i compares 79
0018-9545 © 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
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Fig. 1. PU dynamic settings and different types of attackers.
the reported value from j with its own decision about the PU80
state. Based on this evaluation, node i tags the observation from81
node j as either an agreement or a conflict and records that82
in the corresponding observation vector. The trust score that83
node i assigns to j is then calculated based on the ratio of84
agreements over the total number of observations (the length85
of the observation vector) [12], [13]. We call the above trust86
derivation approach “context-oblivious” as the SU nodes do87
not distinguish between the observations based on the current88
PU activity context. Instead, they make blind observations and89
record all of the observations in a single observation vector90
regardless of the context.91
We will show in this paper that the existing context-oblivious92
trust schemes are vulnerable to ISSDF attacks in dynamic set-93
tings, where the PU of the spectrum band transitions between94
active and inactive states over time. Thus, these techniques can-95
not protect the SUs and accordingly the SU nodes make incorrect96
detection decisions which are harmful to both the primary and97
secondary users of the spectrum.98
Fig. 2(a) shows an example of the vulnerability of the ex-99
isting agreement/conflict context-oblivious trust schemes. The100
Always-Yes attacker broadcasts high values (as its sensing re-101
port) all the time, even when the PU is active; therefore, in an102
active cycle (the duration when the PU is active), an honest node103
will most likely be in agreement with the Always-Yes attacker.104
Thus, the attacker seems to be non-malicious in the view of the105
honest node. As a result, the attacker is highly trusted at the106
end of an active cycle. Fig. 2(b) shows that in an inactive cycle,107
the Always-Yes attacker who has earned high trust in the pre-108
vious active cycle is able to deceive the honest node to believe109
that the PU is active. As a result, the honest SU refrains from110
using the free channel. This increased false alarm rate among111
the honest SUs leads to no utilization or underutilization of the112
free spectrum which is very harmful to the SU network. The113
context-oblivious trust schemes have a similar vulnerability in114
mitigating Always-No attackers in dynamic settings, as the trust115
of Always-No attackers is increased in the PU inactive cycles.116
In this paper, we show the vulnerability of the existing trust117
management schemes in dynamic settings are due to the fact that118
these schemes are context-oblivious. In order to solve the above-119
mentioned problem and to mitigate the attacks effectively, we120
present the following contributions:121
1) To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to intro-122
duce a context-aware trust scheme for DCSS in a mobile123
CRAHN that is resilient to ISSDF attacks in dynamic124
Fig. 2. An Always-Yes attack scenario in PU dynamic settings and vulner-
ability of the existing (context-oblivious) schemes: (a) The trust score of the
Always-Yes attacker is increased when PU is active. (b) In the PU inactive cycle,
the highly trusted attacker deceives the honest SU to believe PU is active; thus,
the honest SU remains inactive and does not use the free channel.
settings where the PU frequently transitions between ac- 125
tive and inactive states. In our proposed scheme, the trust 126
observations are distinguished based on the speculated 127
context: PU-Present or PU-Absent context. Thus, the trust 128
evaluation of a peer SU is significantly more effective than 129
the current context-oblivious schemes because it is done 130
in a more informed manner. 131
2) We present a theoretical analysis to evaluate the agreement 132
probability (thus, the level of trust) between the honest 133
nodes and the attackers in the presence of different types 134
of ISSDF attacks (Always-Yes, Always-No, fabricating) 135
and considering the honest mistakes of the honest nodes. 136
The analysis is presented for both the context-oblivious 137
and the proposed context-aware trust schemes. 138
3) With both theoretical analysis and extensive Monte Carlo 139
simulations, we show that the introduced context-aware 140
trust scheme significantly increases the resilience of itera- 141
tive DCSS schemes to ISSDF attacks in dynamic settings. 142
Adopting the proposed trust scheme enables a mobile SU 143
network with 20% malicious nodes in a realistic and dy- 144
namic environment to satisfy the false alarm and missed- 145
detection rates as low as 10−3. For a similar scenario, the 146
existing trust schemes cannot even achieve an error rate 147
of 10−1 regardless of the detection threshold. 148
4) We show that our proposed trust framework is able to 149
effectively mitigate Always-Yes, Always-No and fabri- 150
cating attacks in different scenarios with high level of 151
attack severity, even when the majority of the nodes in 152
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the network are malicious. In addition, we show that our153
proposed scheme is scalable in terms of network density154
and the distance from the PU transmitter.155
II. RELATED WORK156
The conventional SSDF attacks and mitigation approaches157
against them have been well-studied in the literature for the158
centralized CSS schemes [7], [10], [11], [14]–[18]. A known159
mitigation technique against SSDF attacks is that each node as-160
signs history-based trust scores to its neighbors and it weights161
their sensing reports according to the scores [7]. Recently, aver-162
age consensus algorithms including gossip-based protocols and163
linear iteration-based schemes have been used for the DCSS ap-164
plications [3], [19]–[23]. However, ISSDF attack in the iterative165
DCSS schemes is hardly explored.166
ISSDF attackers are similar to stubborn agents [24], who167
have fixed opinions and do not update their beliefs based on168
other agents’ opinions. It is shown that the initial opinion of169
the normal (not stubborn) agents have essentially no impact170
on the long-run opinion distribution [24]. Sundaram et al. [25]171
also consider a similar attack model aimed at distributed func-172
tion calculation using linear iterations where the attackers do173
not follow the iterative update protocol and instead arbitrarily174
update their values in each iteration. It is shown that the net-175
work graph connectivity is a key factor in resilience to these176
malicious nodes [25]. However, the attack introduced in [25]177
is different from the ISSDF attack in that the attackers do not178
change (falsify) their initial values to affect the cooperation.179
A trust-aware gossip-based DCSS scheme has been proposed180
in [20]; however, it does not consider ISSDF attacks and does181
not benefit from the broadcast nature of wireless and it consid-182
ers sharing of binary decisions among the nodes. A proposed183
approach to mitigate the ISSDF attackers in iterative DCSS184
schemes is outlier detection [26], [27] which is based on detect-185
ing the nodes that broadcast values that are deviated from the186
rest of the neighbors in each iteration. However, this approach187
requires every node to compute a deviation threshold at each188
iteration which imposes a significant computational overhead189
on each SU. In contrast, in our proposed scheme, as will be ex-190
plained, the SUs update the trust scores only once the consensus191
iterations are completed and therefore the computational over-192
head is low. Liu et al. [13] propose a trust scheme using trust193
propagation and a set of pre-trusted nodes to mitigate the effect194
of Byzantine adversaries in linear iterative consensus in sensor195
networks. However, trust propagation is costly and generally196
there are no pre-trusted nodes in an ad hoc network.197
A distributed and low-overhead trust management scheme198
has been proposed recently that is integrated with a consensus-199
inspired DCSS scheme to mitigate ISSDF attacks [12]. However,200
this scheme is context-oblivious, and as explained in Section I201
it cannot mitigate different types of attacks in dynamic settings.202
To the best of our knowledge, the proposed scheme in this paper203
is the first context-aware trust scheme for DCSS applications204
that can effectively mitigate Always-Yes, Always-No and fab-205
ricating ISSDF attackers in dynamic settings without the need206
for centralized or pre-trusted nodes. In addition, our proposed207
Fig. 3. System overview: Mobile SUs (honest and malicious) are moving
in a square location area with diverse shadow fading. Blue represents lower
received signal strength from the PU transmitter due to deep shadow fades and
red represents higher signal strength.
scheme only requires the nodes to perform a single local trust 208
evaluation per sensing round for each direct neighbor, thus the 209
overhead is minimal. 210
III. SYSTEM MODEL 211
We consider a network of n SU nodes that form a mobile 212
CRAHN. The nodes are moving in a square location area within 213
the range of a single stationary PU transmitter which is located 214
outside the square area. Fig. 3 depicts the system overview. 215
Random way point mobility [28] is adopted to model the SU 216
nodes’ mobility. A network of PU receivers (either mobile or 217
stationary) may coexist with the SUs in the same location area. 218
Therefore, whenever the PU transmitter is active, the SU’s must 219
remain silent to avoid interference to the PU receivers. The 220
detection of a PU transmission is modeled as a binary hypothesis 221
testing problem as follows: H0 if PU is absent and H1 if PU is 222
present. Each SU is equipped with an energy detector to perform 223
spectrum sensing by measuring the received power from the PU 224
transmitter. The received signal by an SU can be modeled as 225
follows: 226
y(m) =
{
w(m) H0
s(m) + w(m) H1
(1)
where s(m) is the signal component with power PS and w(m) is 227
the zero-mean additive white Gaussian noise with noise power 228
PN . When the PU is inactive, the sensed power at an SU will 229
essentially be equal to the received noise power. On the other 230
hand, when the PU is active, the signal component power PS in 231
dB can be modeled as PT − PL(d)[dB], where PT is the PU 232
transmission power andPL(d) is the path loss from the PU to the 233
SU located in distance, d. If the power detector takes M samples, 234
the test statistic is given by: Γ = 1M
∑M
m=1 y(m)y(m)
∗
. Using 235
the central limit theorem, it can be shown that for large enough 236
M [29], [30], the test statistic for a detector follows a normal 237
distribution [31]: 238
Γ ∼ N (PS + PN , 2(PS + PN )
2
M
) (2)
We model path loss as PL(d) = PL(d) + ψdB [dB] where 239
PL(d) is the average path loss based on the Hata model (subur- 240
ban areas variant) [32], and ψdB is a Gaussian random variable 241
in dB with zero mean and a standard deviation of σψdB in dB 242
modeling log-normal shadow fading. Therefore the total dB loss 243
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is characterized by a Gaussian distribution with mean PL(d)244
and standard deviation σψdB . The correlation between shadow245
fading at two locations separated by distance δ is characterized246
by A(δ) = σ2ψdB e−δ/Xc , where Xc is the decorrelation distance247
and is usually on the order of the size of the obstacles in the en-248
vironment [32], [33]. Therefore, closely located receivers (with249
smaller δ) experience highly correlated shadowing. We model250
shadows in the environment using random two-dimensional cor-251
related shadow fading maps [34] similar to the example heatmap252
shown in Fig. 3.253
In a non-cooperative scenario, an SU node decides on the PU254
activity by comparing its own received power test statistic, Γ,255
with a detection threshold, γ. The spectrum sensing performance256
is characterized by the probability of false alarm (PF A ) and257
missed-detection (PM D ):258
PF A = Pr(Γ > γ|H0) and PM D = Pr(Γ < γ|H1) (3)
In a distributed cooperative spectrum sensing model, the SU259
nodes first sense and measure the received power and then share260
their power measurements with each other to estimate the aver-261
age received power. After a number of broadcast and update iter-262
ations, each SU compares its own estimate of the average power263
with a threshold to make its final binary decision about the PU264
presence. We assume a fixed communication range for all of the265
SU nodes in the network. When a node broadcasts a message,266
all of the nodes within its predefined radius (one-hop neighbors)267
will receive that message. Obviously, the neighborhoods are al-268
ways changing due to the mobility of the nodes; however, we269
assume that during one sensing period the SU network topology270
remains unchanged. Here we assume perfect communication271
between the SUs via a common control channel [35].272
In a cooperative spectrum sensing model, a subset of nodes273
may be malicious. In this paper, we consider the insistent spec-274
trum sensing data falsification (ISSDF) attack model [8]. ISSDF275
attackers broadcast falsified sensing data to their neighbors in276
order to cause false alarm or missed-detection errors and to277
deteriorate the performance of spectrum sensing at the honest278
(non-malicious) SU nodes. ISSDF attackers do not update their279
estimates according to the cooperation protocol, instead in order280
to make the highest impact on the network, they broadcast their281
falsified values in all of the iterations. We consider three types282
of ISSDF attackers (Always-Yes, Always-No and fabricating).283
In our model, we adopt the trust-aware DCSS scheme intro-284
duced in [12]. The iterative update rule is as follows:285
vi(c + 1) = θii(t)vi(c) +
∑
j∈Ri θij (t)vj (c)
1 + |Ri | , i = 1, ..., n
(4)
where vi(c) denotes the value at SU node i at iteration c, and286
Ri is the set of nodes from which node i received a value in this287
iteration. θij (t) denotes the trust score of node j at the current288
sensing round t in the viewpoint of node i and the self-trust289
is θii(t) = 1−
∑
j ∈R i θi j (t)
1+ |Ri | . The integration of trust scores as290
weights into the linear iteration-based consensus scheme, makes291
the combination biased so that the values from more trustworthy292
neighbors are more effective than the others. The estimation of293
the trust scores has been the subject of study of many of the294
previous research works that were mentioned in Section II and 295
different trust schemes have been proposed [7], [10], [12], [13], 296
[18]. In the next section, we introduce our novel distributed 297
context-aware trust framework for trust score derivation which 298
proves to be significantly superior to the previous methods in 299
realistic dynamic settings. 300
IV. PROPOSED CONTEXT-AWARE TRUST FRAMEWORK 301
In a realistic cognitive radio network, the primary user of 302
the spectrum band transitions between active and inactive states 303
over time. We show that the dynamics of the PU activity makes 304
the existing context-oblivious trust management schemes (e.g. 305
[12], [13]) vulnerable to ISSDF attacks. In the existing trust 306
schemes, each node records all of its observations from another 307
node in a single observation vector, regardless of the context in 308
which the observations are made. 309
In contrast, we introduce a context-aware trust management 310
scheme that separates the observations based on the speculated 311
context (PU-Absent or PU-Present). At each sensing round, each 312
SU speculates about the PU activity using all of the available 313
information (from its own sensing and its cooperating neigh- 314
bors’ reports) and conjectures the current context. Based on this 315
speculated context, the SU will record the observations from 316
its neighbors in the corresponding observation vectors. In fu- 317
ture sections, we show with analysis and experiments that in 318
realistic dynamic scenarios, our proposed context-aware trust 319
scheme is superior to the existing context-oblivious schemes 320
and can effectively mitigate different types of ISSDF attacks. 321
Next, we elaborate the proposed context-aware trust scheme. 322
Node i maintains two observation vectors per each peer 323
node j: 1) “Absent observation vector”, OAij , 2) “Present ob- 324
servation vector”, OPij . At the end of each sensing round, node i 325
speculates and sets the context based on its own final coopera- 326
tive decision: either PU-Absent or PU-Present. If at this sensing 327
round node i has received a value from node j, node i records the 328
observation from node j based on the context. The observation 329
is recorded in OAij if the current context set by i is PU-Absent and 330
in OPij if the context is PU-Present. The observation is binary: 0 331
is recorded if node i and j disagree and 1 is recorded if the two 332
nodes agree on the PU activity in this sensing round. The obser- 333
vation vectors are essentially sliding windows of limited size, 334
thus, if an observation vector is full at the time of recording a 335
new observation, the oldest entry will be discarded. Algorithm 1 336
describes our proposed context-aware observations for context- 337
aware trust management. gij (t) denotes the initial value that 338
node i received from neighbor j in the first consensus iteration 339
of sensing round t, thus, referring back to (4), gij (t) is equiva- 340
lent to vj (0). The final estimate of node i at sensing round t is 341
denoted by yi(t) which is equivalent to vi(c = final iteration) 342
in (4). γ denotes the detection threshold. 343
At sensing round (time) t, node i calculates two trust scores, 344
θAij (t) and θPij (t) based on the absent and present observation 345
vectors, respectively. Equation (5) shows that the scores are 346
calculated based on the fraction of the observations that are 347
agreements. H(.) denotes the Hamming weight of the binary 348
vector and |.| is the length. The required length of the observation 349
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Fig. 4. Proposed context-aware trust scheme: At each sensing round, node i
updates the trust score assigned to node j based on the minimum of the scores
corresponding to the PU-Absent and PU-Present contexts.
vectors are discussed in Section IV-A in detail. We adopt the zero350
trust initialization strategy [12] which means the trust scores351
are initialized to zero and remain zero until the corresponding352
observation vectors are filled up to the predefined vector length.353
In addition, the scores are updated only when the final decisions354
are made at each sensing round and not in between the consensus355
iterations.356
θAij (t) =
H(OAij )
|OijA |
, θPij (t) =
H(OPij )
|OPij |
(5)
In each sensing round, node i cannot make its final decision357
(and set the context) before the cooperation is complete in358
that round. Therefore, during the cooperation, it cannot know359
which of the two trust scores (θAij (t) or θPij (t)) to use for a peer360
nodes j. We propose a conservative approach where the lowest361
of the two scores is picked as the final trust score:362
θij (t) = min(θAij (t), θ
P
ij (t)) (6)
Fig. 4 depicts the context-aware trust update algorithm in a363
flow chart representation showing the procedure of node i364
updating the trust score assigned to node j at one sensing 365
round. Following the proposed strategy, the honest nodes take 366
no risk and as a result, malicious nodes are always detected 367
and excluded. The conservative score assignment strategy is 368
advantageous because a node that is malicious in one context 369
and not malicious in another context is always assigned a low 370
score corresponding to the context in which it is malicious. 371
As a result, a malicious node will have minimum effect on the 372
honest nodes when it performs its malicious behavior. 373
Consider the example of an Always-Yes attacker j and let us 374
inspect how it is mitigated by an honest node i. Adopting the 375
proposed scheme, all of the observations that i makes from j in 376
the PU-Present context are agreements and all of the observa- 377
tions in the PU-Absent context are conflicts. Therefore, node i 378
perceives that node j seems to be non-malicious in PU-Present 379
context and appears to be malicious in the PU-Absent context. 380
Since all of the observations corresponding to the PU-Absent 381
context are conflicts, the PU-Absent context trust score is zero. 382
Node i assigns the minimum of the PU-Absent and PU-Present 383
scores, which is zero, to j. As a result, node i correctly de- 384
tects the malicious behavior of j and neutralizes its effect. Thus, 385
separating the observations based on the context is necessary 386
to detect the attackers. As we showed before in Fig. 2, for the 387
same example, the c ntext-oblivious schemes are vulnerable 388
and ineffective. 389
Note that, non-malicious SUs may make honest mistakes 390
and conjecture the context incorrectly due to shadow fading or 391
noise (e.g., see simulation results for non-cooperative scenario 392
in Section VII) which in turn results in an incorrect observation 393
from a peer node. However, the properties of our proposed trust 394
scheme helps the honest SUs to gain trust from one another and 395
to be able to cooperate to correctly conjecture the context at each 396
sensing round. The facilitating properties include evaluation of 397
trust based on averaging over vectors of observations rather than 398
an instantaneous observation and also the zero trust initialization 399
strategy. In addition, since we take a conservative strategy for 400
trust assignment, in case of incorrect context establishment, the 401
malicious SUs cannot gain high trust. We consider these honest 402
mistakes in our theoretical analysis in Section V and in our 403
simulations. Our simulation results presented in Sections VI 404
and VII confirm that the proposed context-aware trust scheme 405
with conservative score assignment is significantly more stable 406
than context-oblivious trust scheme in all of the experimented 407
scenarios. 408
A. Length of the Trust Observation Vector 409
Since non-malicious nodes make honest errors, instantaneous 410
observations are not sufficient; thus, as described above, the 411
nodes must make several observations from each other and store 412
them in vectors and rely on the average scores. The honest nodes 413
experience different shadowing and noise levels during time 414
and as they move; therefore, for a sufficiently long observation 415
vector, the average trust scores are more reliable. The shadowing 416
characteristic (decorrelation distance or size of the shadows) 417
and also the mobility characteristics determine the minimum 418
required length of the observation vectors. For example, if the 419
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shadows are too large or if the nodes move very slowly, a longer420
vector may be needed for better trust evaluations between the421
nodes so that the effect of shadowing can be filtered out. On the422
other hand, shorter vectors may be preferred in dynamic attack423
scenarios to achieve fast trust update response to changes in424
nodes’ behavior.425
In conclusion, the length of the observation vectors must be426
determined considering the above trade-offs and the character-427
istics of the system. For example, as will be described later in428
Section VI, for our particular simulation setup, we found that the429
observation vector length of 8 is sufficient. As discussed before,430
adopting the zero trust initialization strategy, each SU initially431
does not trust any of the other nodes in the network. An SU432
can assign a non-zero trust score to another SU as soon as the433
observation vectors are of length 8 and some of the observations434
are agreements. However, the trust score of the malicious SUs435
will remain low because at least in one of the two contexts the436
conflict rate between the honest node and the attackers is high.437
The honest nodes then cooperate with their trusted peers to make438
more accurate final decisions that set the context for the future439
trust evaluations.440
B. Mutual Trust Between Two Honest Nodes441
As mentioned before, the honest nodes may make non-442
malicious mistakes due to fading and noise; therefore, two hon-443
est nodes may not agree in their spectrum sensing decisions in a444
sensing round. In the case of a disagreement between two honest445
nodes, both of the nodes will decrease the trust score assigned446
to the other node. Decreasing the score of a non-malicious node447
that is highly unreliable and reports incorrect data to its neigh-448
bors is desired. Such a scenario occurs if there are a subset of449
honest nodes in the network that experience higher noise or are450
located in deep shadows and moving very slowly or not moving451
out of shadow at all. However, in a mobile network, where on452
average all of the nodes experience the same level of noise and453
shadowing and have similar mobility characteristics, the aver-454
age error rates are the same for all of the peer non-malicious455
nodes.456
Therefore, the disagreement between two non-malicious457
nodes is transient. As discussed before, the trust evaluation458
based on averaging over a vector of observations filters out459
these transient mistakes. As a result, over a sufficient number460
of observations made in both PU-Present and PU-Absent co-461
ntexts every two normal honest nodes agree with each other462
more than they disagree. As an example for transient distrust463
between two honest nodes, consider an honest node i that is464
located in a shadow area for a while and thus it incorrectly de-465
creases the trust score of an honest neighbor j since they disagree466
in the PU-Absent context. However, the distrust is transient be-467
cause as soon as node i moves out of shadow, the two nodes468
start to agree with each other in the PU-Absent context and i469
increases the assigned trust score to j.470
Certainly, there is an inevitable delay associated with the471
transient effect of the mutual distrust of the honest nodes and472
this delay will impact the resulting performance negatively.473
Nevertheless, this is essentially the cost that we pay for trust474
management to prevent the risk of potential attacks and to miti- 475
gate the malicious behavior in the cooperation. As we will show 476
in our analysis and experiments, this negative effect is highly 477
dominated by the positive impact of the trust scheme in detecting 478
and excluding the malicious nodes. 479
Note that, although we do not explicitly present the mutual 480
trust scores between the honest SUs in the simulation results, 481
in all of our experiments honest nodes do assign trust scores to 482
each other; thus, the presented missed-detection and false alarm 483
rates do include in them the degradation due to the transient 484
distrust. We refer the interested reader to a detailed theoretical 485
analysis and experimental results of the honest-to-honest trust 486
which we have presented in [9, Ch. 6]. 487
V. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF CONTEXT-AWARE VERSUS 488
CONTEXT-OBLIVIOUS TRUST 489
As described in Section IV, a trust score that a node k1 as- 490
signs to another node k2 (denoted by θk1,k2 ) is a measure of the 491
probability of node k2 being honest in the view of k1. Node k1 492
continuously makes observations from k2 and the trust score is 493
calculated based on the fraction of observations that are agree- 494
ments. Therefore, the trust score essentially approximates the 495
agreement probability in the most recent set of interactions be- 496
tween the two nodes. In this section, we analyze the agreement 497
probability between the honest nodes and the malicious nodes 498
for both the context-oblivious and the proposed context-aware 499
trust schemes. 500
A. Context-Oblivious Trust Management 501
In a context-oblivious trust scheme, node k1 stores its obser- 502
vations from node k2 in a single observation vector Ok1,k2 . The 503
event of a node k1 making an observation of node k2 may occur 504
in two conditions: while PU is absent (H0 is true), and while PU 505
is present (H1 is true). Therefore the probability of k1 agreeing 506
with k2 can be written as: 507
Pr(agreek1,k2) = Pr(agreek1,k2 |H0)Pr(H0)
+ Pr(agreek1,k2 |H1)Pr(H1) (7)
From (7), we can see that if the length of the observation vector 508
is short relative to the PU activity period, then depending on 509
whether H0 or H1 is true, one of the two components in (7) be- 510
comes dominant. For example, when PU is absent for a while, 511
all or most of the observations in the observation vector may be 512
from this recent PU inactive cycle and therefore the agreement 513
between the two nodes (and consequently the trust scores) are 514
affected almost only by the probability component correspond- 515
ing to H0. If the observation vector is much longer than the 516
period of the PU activity, then on average both probability com- 517
ponents corresponding to H0 and H1 will have similar effect in 518
the trust score. 519
In the following paragraphs, we analyze the probability that 520
an honest node h1 agrees with a fabricating, Always-Yes or 521
Always-No attacker. The trust scores that the honest nodes as- 522
sign to their peers are essentially measured approximations of 523
the agreement probabilities. 524
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1) Agreement Between Honest and Fabricating: A fabricat-525
ing attacker always reports the opposite of the truth about the526
PU activity. Therefore, when an honest node h1 makes an obser-527
vation from a fabricating attacker f1, there are two conditions528
in which the two nodes agree: 1) when H0 is true and h1 makes529
a false alarm error, 2) if H1 is true and h1 makes a missed-530
detection error. Equation (8) shows the agreement probability531
between the two nodes:532
Pr(agreeh1,f1) = Pr(Fh1)Pr(H0) + Pr(Mh1)Pr(H1) (8)
where, Pr(Fk ) and Pr(Mk ) of a node k denote the probability533
of false alarm and missed-detection of node k, respectively. If534
the cooperative decisions of the honest nodes have very low false535
alarm and missed-detection rates, the agreement rate with the536
fabricating attacker will be very small as well, thus the assigned537
trust scores will be small. However, when honest nodes make538
honest mistakes either in the presence or absence of the PU, in539
both cases they incorrectly agree with the fabricating attackers540
and as a result their associated trust scores are increased. For541
example if PU stays inactive for a while and the honest nodes542
make many false alarm errors, most of the observations in the543
observation vector Oh1f1 are made in H0 and the probability544
of agreement is essentially close to Pr(Fh1) which is high. As545
a result, when PU finally becomes active, initially, the highly546
trusted fabricating attackers can significantly affect the detection547
performance in this cycle.548
Therefore, when the context-oblivious strategy is employed,549
if either missed-detection or false alarm rate of the honest nodes550
is high, due to deep shadow or high noise, the trust score of fab-551
ricating attackers will be increased. We will discuss and show552
in our simulation results in the next sections that the incorrect553
increase in trust score of fabricating attackers due to honest mis-554
takes has a destructive effect on the PU detection performance.555
In contrast, as shown later, the proposed context-aware trust556
scheme alleviates this problem by considering separate contexts557
of observations and taking the worst case (the minimum agree-558
ment among the two contexts.)559
2) Agreement Between Honest and Always-Yes: An Always-560
Yes attacker always broadcasts reports that indicate the presence561
of the PU. Therefore, an honest node h1 agrees with an Always-562
Yes attacker, y1, in the following cases: 1) if H0 is true and node563
h1 makes a false alarm, 2) if H1 is true and h1 does not make a564
missed-detection error and actually decides that PU is present.565
Equation (9) derives the agreement probability:566
Pr(agreeh1,y1) = Pr(Fh1)Pr(H0) + Pr(Mh1)Pr(H1) (9)
Obviously, when H1 is true, an Always-Yes attacker’s report is567
indeed correct. Therefore, adopting this context-oblivious trust568
management scheme, an honest node will incorrectly increase569
the trust score of an Always-Yes attacker even when the hon-570
est node has low error rate (in this case when the honest node571
does not make missed-detection errors). As we show later, this572
shortcoming of the context-oblivious trust management is sig-573
nificant and results in the inability of the trust scheme to mitigate574
Always-Yes attacks.575
3) Agreement Between Honest and Always-No: Similarly,576
(10) derives the agreement probability between an honest node,577
h1, and an Always-No attacker, n1 : 578
Pr(agreeh1,n1) = Pr(Fh1)Pr(H0) + Pr(Mh1)Pr(H1)
(10)
Therefore, an honest node (with a low false alarm rate) in- 579
creases the trust score of an Always-No attacker when PU is 580
absent. This makes the context-oblivious trust scheme vulnera- 581
ble to Always-No attacks. 582
B. The Proposed Context-Aware Trust Management Scheme 583
As described in Section IV, the proposed context-aware trust 584
scheme separates the observations from each node to two con- 585
texts, PU-Absent and PU-Present. For both contexts, the event 586
of a node k1 making an observation of another node k2 may oc- 587
cur either when H0 is true or when H1 is true. The context is set 588
by k1’s cooperative final decision which is its best estimate of 589
the PU activity; therefore, “Absent observations” are not neces- 590
sarily made while H0 is true and “Present observations” are not 591
necessarily made while H1 is true. In this section, we analyze 592
the agreement probability in both PU-Absent and PU-Present 593
contexts to understand the trust scores corresponding to each of 594
these contexts. 595
When a node k1 makes a cooperative final decision to set the 596
context for its observations, one of the following four events 597
occurs: 598
1) BA0 : H0 is true and the final decision is PU-Absent. 599
Pr(BA0 ) = Pr(H0)Pr(Fk1) 600
2) BP0 : H0 is true and the final decision is PU-Present. 601
Pr(BP0 ) = Pr(H0)Pr(Fk1) 602
3) BA1 : H1 is true and the final decision is PU-Absent. 603
Pr(BA1 ) = Pr(H1)Pr(Mk1) 604
4) BP1 : H1 is true and the final decision is PU-Present. 605
Pr(BP1 ) = Pr(H1)Pr(Mk1) 606
Obviously, BP0 and BA1 occur when the node makes a false 607
alarm and missed-detection error, respectively. In contrast, in 608
the events BA0 and BP1 , the node is not in error. We denote the 609
event where the context is set to PU-Absent by BA , which is 610
the union of the events BA0 and BA1 . Therefore, the probability 611
of BA can be derived as follows: 612
Pr(BA ) = Pr(BA0 ) + Pr(B
A
1 )
= Pr(H0)Pr(Fk1) + Pr(H1)Pr(Mk1) (11)
Similarly, we denote the event where the context is set to PU- 613
Present by BP , which is the union of the events BP0 and BP1 . 614
Therefore, we have: 615
Pr(BP ) = Pr(BP0 ) + Pr(B
P
1 )
= Pr(H0)Pr(Fk1) + Pr(H1)Pr(Mk1) (12)
For a node k1, we can derive the following conditional 616
probabilities: 617
Pr(BA0 |BA ) =
Pr(H0)Pr(Fk1)
Pr(H0)Pr(Fk1) + Pr(H1)Pr(Mk1)
(13)
Pr(BA1 |BA ) =
Pr(H1)Pr(Mk1)
Pr(H0)Pr(Fk1) + Pr(H1)Pr(Mk1)
(14)
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Pr(BP0 |BP ) =
Pr(H0)Pr(Fk1)
Pr(H0)Pr(Fk1) + Pr(H1)Pr(Mk1)
(15)
Pr(BP1 |BP ) =
Pr(H1)Pr(Mk1)
Pr(H0)Pr(Fk1) + Pr(H1)Pr(Mk1)
(16)
We denote the probability of node k1 agreeing with node619
k2 in the PU-Absent context and PU-Present context by620
Pr(agreeAk1,k2) and Pr(agree
P
k1,k2
), respectively. These prob-621
abilities are written in (17) and (18), respectively.622
Pr(agreeAk1,k2) =
Pr(agreek1,k2 |BA ) = Pr(agreek1,k2 |BA0 )Pr(BA0 |BA )
+ Pr(agreek1,k2 |BA1 )Pr(BA1 |BA )
(17)
Pr(agreePk1,k2) =
Pr(agreek1,k2 |BP ) = Pr(agreek1,k2 |BP0 )Pr(BP0 |BP )
+ Pr(agreek1,k2 |BP1 )Pr(BP1 |BP )
(18)
1) Agreement Between Honest and Fabricating:623
a) PU-absent context: When honest node h1’s final deci-624
sion (and thus the context) is PU-Absent, it records its obser-625
vation from a fabricating node f1 in the “Absent observation626
vector”, OAh1,f1 . In this context, if H0 is true (the ground truth627
is that PU is absent), the two nodes definitely disagree since the628
fabricating node’s report indicates that PU is active. On the other629
hand, if H1 is true, then the two nodes definitely agree, because630
the fabricating node’s report indicates that PU is inactive in this631
case. Therefore we have the following:632
Pr(agreeh1,f1 |BA0 ) = 0
Pr(agreeh1,f1 |BA1 ) = 1 (19)
As a result by replacement in (17), the probability of agreement633
in the PU-Absent context is equal to the probability that h1 sets634
the context to PU-Absent while the PU is present which means635
h1 must make a missed-detection error. Using (14), we have the636
following:637
Pr(agreeAh1,f1) = Pr(B
A
1 |BA )
=
Pr(H1)Pr(Mh1)
Pr(H0)Pr(Fh1) + Pr(H1)Pr(Mh1)
(20)
b) PU-present context: When honest node h1’s final de-638
cision (and thus the context) is PU-Present, it records its obser-639
vation from a fabricating node f1 in the “Present observation640
vector”, OPh1,f1 . In this context, if H0 is true, the two nodes641
definitely agree since the fabricating node reports that PU is642
active. On the other hand, if H1 is true, the two nodes definitely643
disagree. Therefore we have the following:644
Pr(agreeh1,f1 |BP0 ) = 1
Pr(agreeh1,f1 |BP1 ) = 0 (21)
By replacement in (18), the probability of agreement in the 645
PU-Present context is equal to the probability that h1 sets the 646
context to PU-Present while the PU is absent which means h1 647
must make a false alarm error. Using (15), we have: 648
Pr(agreePh1,f1) = Pr(B
P
0 |BP )
=
Pr(H0)Pr(Fh1)
Pr(H0)Pr(Fh1) + Pr(H1)Pr(Mh1)
(22)
The trust score that node h1 assigns to fabricating node f1 is 649
then calculated based on the minimum of the scores derived 650
from the two observation vectors (contexts) as described above 651
(minimum of (20) and (22)). 652
2) Agreement Between Honest and Always-Yes: An Always- 653
Yes attacker, y1, always reports to an honest node h1 that PU 654
is active. Therefore, whenever h1’s final decision is PU-Absent, 655
the observation from y1 is definitely a conflict (probability of 656
agreement is zero) and is recorded in the “Absent observation 657
vector”. Note that, the agreement rate is exactly zero regardless 658
of whether h1 sets the context to PU-Absent by mistake (i.e., 659
regardless of the ground truth of the PU activity.) Conversely, 660
whenever h1’s final decision is PU-Present, the observation from 661
y1 is definitely an agreement (probability of agreement is one) 662
and is recorded in the “Present observation vector”. As a result, 663
adopting the context-aware trust, an honest node always assigns 664
the minimum trust score which is zero to an Always-Yes attacker 665
and thus can successfully exclude it: 666
Pr(agreeAh1,y1) = 0
Pr(agreePh1,y1) = 1
min(Pr(agreeAh1,y1), P r(agree
P
h1,y1
)) = 0 (23)
3) Agreement Between Honest and Always-No: An Always- 667
No attacker, n1, always indicates that PU is inactive to an 668
honest node h1. Therefore, whenever h1’s final decision is 669
PU-Absent, the observation from y1 is definitely an agreement 670
and is recorded in the “Absent observation vector”. Whenever 671
h1’s final decision is PU-Present, the observation from y1 is 672
definitely a conflict and is recorded in the “Present observation 673
vector”. Taking the minimum, an honest node always assigns 674
a zero trust score to an Always-No attacker, which means the 675
honest node can successfully exclude the attacker: 676
Pr(agreeAh1,n1) = 1
Pr(agreePh1,n1) = 0
min(Pr(agreeAh1,n1), P r(agree
P
h1,n1
)) = 0 (24)
In the next section, we evaluate the probability of agreement 677
between an honest node and an attacker (different types) with 678
simulations in realistic settings. We will show that in all of the 679
simulation scenarios under different types of attacks, adopting 680
the context-aware trust scheme significantly reduces the effect 681
of the attackers by assigning the lowest trust scores to them. 682
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TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS FOR EVALUATING TRUST-AWARE DCSS
Path Loss and Shadow Fading Random Way Point Model
PU Dist. from CRAHN 15 km CRAHN Area 200 m × 200 m
PU Antenna Height 30 m Min Velocity 1 m/s
SU Antenna Height 1 m Max Velocity 2 m/s
Center Freq. 615 MHz Min Pause 60 s
Log-normal Shadowing 8 dB Max Pause 120 s
SD (σψ dB )
Decorrelation Dist. (Xc ) 50 m
Transmit Power (PT ) 54 dBm
Noise and Threshold Monte Carlo Simulation
Noise Figure 11 dB # SU Nodes 25
Channel Bandwidth 6 MHz # Consensus Iter. 4
Noise Power (PN ) −95.22 dBm SU Node Range 80 m
Threshold (γ) [−96, −80] dBm Simulation Time 8000 s
Sense Interval 2 s
PU activity period 800 s
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS683
In this section, we present the results of our Monte Carlo sim-684
ulations to evaluate the performance of our proposed context-685
aware trust scheme in mitigating the effect of different types of686
attackers. Table I describes our simulation setup. We consider a687
network of 25 SU nodes that are mobile in a 200 m × 200 m688
square location area. Each SU node can communicate with any689
of the other SU nodes located within its 80 m radius. We make690
the assumption that the sensing frequency of the SUs in the net-691
work is much faster than the PU activity frequency: Each SU692
senses the spectrum every 2 seconds (as recommended in IEEE693
802.22 [36]) and the PU’s period of activity is 800 seconds with694
a 50% duty cycle, which means the PU is active for 400 seconds695
and inactive for 400 seconds periodically. Each Monte Carlo696
simulation employs a different and randomly generated shadow697
fading map and it spans 8000 seconds during which the SUs are698
mobile. In each sensing round, the number of consensus iter-699
ations is 4 (See (4): the iterative update.) From the simulation700
parameters, it can be derived that at any point of time each of701
the 25 SUs in the network has 11 neighbors on average (for702
uniformly distributed nodes in the square location area.) Since703
the nodes are moving in the area, their neighborhoods are con-704
stantly changing. The presented results in this section in terms705
of false alarm and missed-detection performance are averaged706
over 10000 Monte Carlo runs to ensure sufficient randomness707
is captured.708
As explained in Section IV-A, the minimum required length709
for the observation vector is determined by the characteristics710
of the system. According to our experimental results, the length711
of 8 is sufficient for our system setup and thus we have fixed712
Omin = 8 in our experiments that are presented in this section713
(no considerable performance improvement was observed using714
larger observation vector lengths 16 and 32). The length of715
the observation vector, 8, is small compared to the period of716
the PU activity. In addition, for this fixed observation vector717
length, we experimented with smaller PU activity period of718
80 s and 8 s and no noticeable difference has been observed in719
the performance of our proposed context-aware trust scheme.720
Zero trust initialization is used in all of the experiments unless 721
otherwise stated. 722
A. Mitigating Always-Yes Attack 723
Fig. 5 presents the average false alarm and missed-detection 724
rates from Monte Carlo simulations in a scenario where 20% of 725
the SUs are Always-Yes attackers. The figure also depicts the 726
agreement probability between an honest SU and an Always- 727
Yes attacker based on the analysis in Sections V-A and V-B and 728
using average false alarm and missed-detection rates that are 729
measured from the simulations. 730
Fig. 5(a) and (b) show the results corresponding to 731
the context-oblivious and the proposed context-aware trust 732
schemes, respectively. The context-oblivious scheme incor- 733
rectly assigns high trust scores to the Always-Yes attackers, 734
since in the PU active cycles, the honest SUs agree with the 735
Always-Yes nodes. In addition, for low detection thresholds, 736
where the false alarm rate of the honest SUs is high, they 737
agree with the Always-Yes attackers even in the PU inactive 738
cycles. The agreement with Always-Yes attackers decreases as 739
the threshold increases and false alarm rate decreases. 740
On the other hand, as discussed in Section V-B2, with the pro- 741
posed context-aware scheme, an honest node is able to correctly 742
assign the trust score of 0 to an Always-Yes attacker because 743
it takes the minimum of the trust scores in the PU-Present and 744
PU-Absent contexts (See (23).) In Fig. 5(b) only the minimum 745
of the two agreement probabilities is shown which is 0. Thus, as 746
seen from the figure, the proposed scheme effectively mitigates 747
the attack and the false alarm rate sharply drops for the detection 748
thresholds above the average noise power (vertical black dashed 749
line at -95.22 dBm.) Thus, in terms of false alarm error rate, the 750
context-aware trust strategy performs significantly better than 751
the context-oblivious trust strategy. 752
In terms of missed-detection, the error rate intuitively in- 753
creases for higher detection thresholds in both the context- 754
oblivious and context-aware schemes. Since the Always-Yes 755
attackers broadcast high values regardless of the PU activ- 756
ity, the malicious behavior of these attackers is advantageous 757
when the PU is present. The reason is that the nodes in shad- 758
ows might be corrected by cooperating with the Always-Yes 759
nodes. We call this a positive side-effect of the Always-Yes 760
malicious behavior. As a result, excluding the attackers has the 761
counter-intuitive result of higher missed-detection errors. Since 762
the context-oblivious trust strategy is not as effective as 763
the context-aware scheme in mitigating Always-Yes attackers, 764
it results in better missed-detection rate as shown in Fig. 5. 765
Nevertheless, the negative effect of the Always-Yes attackers 766
is significant when PU is inactive and therefore these attackers 767
must be mitigated using the trust scheme. Receiver Operating 768
Characteristic (ROC) curves enable us to fairly evaluate our 769
proposed context-aware trust scheme as we need both of the 770
missed-detection and false alarm error rates to be as small as 771
possible at the same time for a given detection threshold. ROC 772
curves in Fig. 6 show missed-detection and false alarm error 773
rates for a range of detection thresholds (as described in Ta- 774
ble I) in two scenarios: 1) in the presence of 20% Always-Yes 775
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Fig. 5. 20% Always-Yes ISSDF attack (Vertical dashed lines: Noise power).
(a) Context-oblivious trust management. (b) Proposed context-aware trust
management.
Fig. 6. ROC performance analysis: Resilient DCSS with proposed context-
aware trust scheme mitigating Always-Yes ISSDF attack.
attackers, and 2) with no attackers. It is clear from the ROC776
plots that the proposed context-aware trust strategy is able to ef-777
fectively contain the attack and maintain the error rate close to778
the no-attack case. In conclusion, as the presented ROC curve779
reveals, our proposed scheme offers sufficiently low missed-780
detection and false alarm rates at the same time in the presence781
of Always-Yes attackers.782
B. Mitigating Always-No Attack783
Fig. 7 shows the resulting average false alarm and missed-784
detection rates of the Monte Carlo simulations for the scenario785
where 20% of the SUs conduct Always-No attacks. The figure786
Fig. 7. 20% Always-No ISSDF attack (Vertical dashed lines: Noise power).
(a) Context-oblivious trust management. (b) Proposed context-aware trust man-
agement.
Fig. 8. ROC performance analysis: Resilient DCSS with proposed context-
aware trust scheme mitigating Always-No ISSDF attack.
presents the results for both context-oblivious and our proposed 787
context-aware trust schemes. It also depicts the agreement 788
probability based on the analysis in Sections V-A and V-B and 789
using average false alarm and missed-detection rates from the 790
simulations. 791
As can be seen from the figure, in terms of missed-detection 792
error rate, the context-aware trust strategy performs better than 793
the context-oblivious trust strategy. As explained in Section V-A 794
and shown in Fig. 7(a) the context-oblivious trust incorrectly as- 795
signs high trust scores to the Always-No attackers as the agree- 796
ment probability is high in all of the PU inactive cycles. For very 797
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low thresholds, where false alarm is too high, the trust score is798
low but as the threshold increases and the false alarm rate drops,799
in a PU inactive cycle, the Always-No attackers are in agree-800
ment with the honest nodes and as the duty cycle of PU is 0.5801
their trust score approaches to 0.5. When the threshold is too802
high and the missed-detection rate starts to increase, the trust803
of the Always-No attackers increases even more because now804
the agreement between the honest nodes and the attackers also805
occurs in the PU active cycles. On the other hand, as seen from806
Fig. 7(b), with our proposed context-aware trust management,807
the honest nodes assign trust of zero to the Always-No attackers808
(See (24)) and therefore can effectively mitigate them. Similar809
to the case of the Always-Yes attack, here Always-No attackers810
have a positive side effect on the false alarm rate, meaning that811
since they broadcast low values even when PU is absent, they812
will reduce the chance of false alarms in the network. Therefore,813
in terms of false alarm rate, at very low thresholds (below the814
noise power) the context-oblivious scheme performs better than815
the context-aware scheme . Fig. 8 presents the resulting ROC816
curve for the scenario 20% Always-No attack. It is clear that the817
proposed context-aware trust management effectively mitigates818
the attackers and maintains a performance close to the no-attack819
scenario.820
C. Mitigating Fabricating Attack821
Fig. 9 compares the performance results and the agreement822
probabilities of the context-oblivious and context-aware trust823
schemes in a scenario where 20% of the SUs are fabricating824
attackers. As seen from the results, the proposed context-aware825
trust scheme is superior to the context-oblivious trust in terms826
of both false alarm and missed-detection.827
Fabricating attackers always broadcast a fabricated value that828
is the opposite of the true sensing measurement. Therefore, if829
an honest node does not make false alarm or missed-detection830
mistakes, then in both of the PU active and inactive cycles, the831
node will be in conflict with a fabricating attacker. However, if832
the honest nodes do make erroneous final decisions, then adopt-833
ing the context-oblivious trust scheme, they incorrectly increase834
the trust of the fabricating attackers (See (8) in Section V-A.)835
The honest/fabricating agreement in the context-oblivious836
scheme shown in Fig. 9(a) confirms that for both high false alarm837
rate (for low thresholds on the left) and high missed-detection838
rate (for high thresholds on the right), the honest/fabricating839
agreement is increased. As a result the context-oblivious trust840
scheme cannot mitigate the impact of the fabricating attackers841
in these cases. In high false alarm case (due to high noise), the842
trusted fabricating attackers can increase missed-detection rate843
and in high missed-detection case (due to deep shadow), the844
trusted attackers can increase false alarm rate.845
On the other hand, the proposed context-aware trust scheme,846
as shown in Fig. 9(b), picks the minimum of the trust scores as-847
sociated with “Absent observations” and “Present observations”848
to filter out the mistakenly high honest/fabricating agreements849
at the two extremes of the threshold range. As a result, a small850
trust score, close to zero is assigned to the fabricating attacker.851
The honest nodes may be unreliable either because they are852
Fig. 9. 20% Fabricating ISSDF attack (Vertical dashed lines: Noise power).
(a) Context-oblivious trust management. (b) Proposed context-aware trust
management.
Fig. 10. ROC performance analysis: Resilient DCSS with proposed context-
aware trust scheme mitigating fabricating ISSDF attack.
likely to make missed-detection errors (high detection thresh- 853
olds relative to the signal strength) or false alarm errors (low 854
thresholds relative to the noise level) but normally not both at 855
the same time. Therefore, by adopting the context-aware trust 856
strategy, the honest nodes will be able to detect the malicious 857
behavior and to update the score of the fabricating attackers cor- 858
rectly. Our proposed context-aware trust management scheme 859
is more cautious, by separating the observations in PU-Present 860
and PU-Absent contexts and picking the minimum of the two 861
scores (See (20) and (22).) The ROC curves in Fig. 10 clearly 862
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show that the context-aware trust is essential and effective in863
mitigating the attack in the case of fabricating attack as well.864
D. Discussion on the Simulation Results865
The results presented in this section for various scenarios866
reveal that by adopting the proposed context-aware scheme, the867
resultant performance is consistent across all of the three types868
of attacks. As shown in Figs. 5, 7, and 9, unlike the context-869
oblivious scheme, the context-aware scheme results in the same870
missed-detection and false alarm rates in all of the three cases871
by maintaining a trust score of zero or close to zero for the872
attackers. Similarly, the ROC plots in Figs. 6, 8, and 10, confirm873
that our scheme offers essentially the same performance for all874
of the attack cases by successfully neutralizing the attackers875
(which form 20% of the network). Therefore, the proposed trust876
scheme offers a comprehensive solution for mitigating different877
attack scenarios.878
In the next section, we continue our analysis and comparison879
with respect to different characteristics of the network including880
the attack severity, the SU network density and the distance of881
the network to the PU. In addition, we analyze the dynamic882
range of the detection threshold in different scenarios to satisfy883
a desired performance in the presence of attackers.884
VII. COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS885
A. Mitigating Attacks of Different Severity Levels886
In Fig. 11 we analyze a few examples of simulation runs that887
show the progress over time of the average of the trust scores that888
the honest nodes in the network assign to one typical Always-889
Yes attacker. For this particular simulation, we have fixed the890
detection threshold to -93 dBm, a middle threshold where the891
average error rates for the honest nodes is not at high rates (at892
this threshold, the measured average probabilities of false alarm893
and missed-detection for an individual honest node are 0.0007894
and 0.0276, respectively.)895
The simulation spans 4000 sensing rounds (8000 s) and dur-896
ing this time the nodes are mobile. The shown plots have one897
data point per 50 s. For this set of experiments, we enforced898
an initial trust score of 0.5 for all of the nodes (rather than ini-899
tializing to zero) in order to show how the honest nodes are900
able to reduce the trust of an attacker from 0.5 to zero and to901
maintain the zero trust. Fig. 11(a) shows the results where 20%902
of the nodes are attackers. As expected, in the context-oblivious903
trust scheme, the trust of the Always-Yes attacker is increased904
whenever PU is active. The randomness of the trust score is905
due to the mobility of the nodes and the changes in the neigh-906
borhoods; nevertheless, the increase in the trust score in active907
cycles (shaded areas) is clearly seen. As mentioned before, this908
is the reason why the context-oblivious trust is not effective in909
mitigating the attackers.910
Note that, with the context-oblivious scheme, the assigned911
trust to the Always-Yes attacker remains high in most of the912
inactive cycles (white areas) showing only a small decrease.913
This clearly shows that once the ISSDF Always-Yes attackers914
in the network gained increased trust (in the active cycles), they915
Fig. 11. Average trust score of the honest nodes assigned to a typical Always-
Yes attacker. Trust scores initialized to 0.5. Detection threshold = −93 dBm.
(a) 20% Always-Yes ISSDF attackers. (b) Different severities of Always-Yes
ISSDF attack.
Fig. 12. ROC performance analysis: The proposed resilient DCSS scheme
with context-aware trust under various Always-Yes ISSDF attack severity.
strongly affect the final decisions of the honest nodes in the 916
inactive cycles. Since the honest nodes mistakenly decide PU 917
is active, the Always-Yes attackers appear to be in agreement 918
with the honest nodes which in turn makes the honest nodes 919
believe the attackers are trustworthy. As a result, the trust as- 920
sociated with the attacker is hardly decreased. In contrast, the 921
proposed context-aware trust scheme, successfully reduces the 922
trust of the Always-Yes attacker from the initial trust score 923
down to 0 and keeps it low and therefore effectively excludes 924
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the malicious node. Fig. 11(b) compares the trust progress in925
different attack severity scenarios. All of the attackers in the926
network are of the same type (i.e., Always-Yes) and thus they927
strengthen each other’s effect. As seen in the plot, the proposed928
context-aware trust successfully reduces the trust score of the929
attacker to zero even when the majority of the nodes are attack-930
ers (60%). The Always-Yes attackers initially have a trust score931
of 0.5 in the viewpoint of all of the honest nodes in the network.932
As the honest nodes observe these attackers, they fill up their933
observation vectors corresponding to both the PU-Absent and934
PU-Present contexts. As soon as the number of observations935
in a vector reaches the predefined minimum (8 observations),936
the trust score that is calculated based on these observations (5)937
replaces the initial 0.5 score.938
As described in the previous section, whenever the final de-939
cision of an honest node is PU-Absent, its observation from an940
Always-Yes attacker will be a conflict. Therefore, as soon as 8941
PU-Absent observations are made from an Always-Yes attacker,942
the score corresponding to PU-Absent context will be zero and943
thus the honest node assigns the smaller trust score of the two944
contexts (which is zero) to the attacker (See (23).) Although in945
our experiment, the PU is absent half of the time, initially due to946
the effect of the Always-Yes attackers (with initial trust scores of947
0.5), the honest nodes are misled to decide that the PU is present948
most of the time. As a result, the PU-Absent observation vec-949
tors of an honest node get filled-up (i.e. reaches 8 observations)950
in a longer period of time compared with a no-attack scenario.951
The more severe the attack is, the attackers are initially more952
effective and it takes the honest nodes a longer time and a larger953
number of observations to fill their PU-Absent vectors. As a re-954
sult, for more severe attacks, the convergence of the trust score955
towards zero takes a longer time. However, as seen in Fig. 11(b)956
in all of the attack scenarios including the most severe ones,957
eventually, the trust is reduced to zero. Therefore, the attackers958
are completely neutralized.959
Fig. 12 shows the ROC results of Monte Carlo simulations960
of Always-Yes attack scenarios of different severity levels.961
This figure is an extension to the previously shown Fig. 6,962
where only 20% attack was considered. The simulation setup is963
the same as the setup described in Section VI (thus, adopting the964
zero trust initialization strategy.) The proposed scheme success-965
fully mitigates the attacks in all of the scenarios including the966
case where the majority of the SUs are malicious. For compari-967
son, we also show ROC of the non-cooperative case where the968
SU nodes make decisions independently without cooperation.969
Thus, in the non-cooperative scenario, the SU nodes are greatly970
affected by shadow fading and noise but they are not affected by971
ISSDF attackers. By utilizing the context-aware trust scheme,972
even under the most severe attack (i.e. 60% of the network),973
the resulting performance of the cooperative spectrum sensing974
is significantly better than the non-cooperative scenario. There-975
fore, the trust scheme successfully restricts the destructive effect976
of the attackers on the cooperation.977
As shown before, the performance of the proposed trust978
scheme is consistent across different types of attacks. Similar979
results for attack severity scalability are achieved for Always-980
No and fabricating attacks. These results show that our proposed981
Fig. 13. Range of detection thresholds to realize desired operating regions
in terms of PM D and PF A . (a) Under 20% Always-Yes attack: With context-
oblivious trust. (b) Under 20% Always-Yes attack: With context-aware trust.
(c) No attack.
trust scheme is able to alleviate various attacks of different sever- 982
ity levels, thus, it provides an effective defense system against 983
ISSDF for a wide variety of realistic scenarios. 984
B. Enhanced Detection Threshold Dynamic Range 985
Fig. 13 compares the ranges of the detection thresholds that 986
satisfy different operating regions in terms of missed-detection 987
and false alarm rates for different scenarios. Under 20% Always- 988
Yes attack, the context-aware trust helps to maintain the dynamic 989
range of the detection threshold to approach to the honest case. 990
In contrast, using the context-oblivious trust scheme, the attack 991
affects the network significantly; as a result, regardless of the 992
detection threshold, none of the operating regions, not even 993
the most relaxed one (10−1 error rate) can be achieved. The 994
presented results confirm the significance of the proposed trust 995
scheme in enhancing the flexibility and relaxing the sensitivity 996
requirements of the cognitive radio devices. 997
C. Scalability of the Proposed Trust Scheme 998
In this section, we analyze the scalability of the proposed 999
context-aware trust scheme for DCSS in terms of SU network 1000
density and distance of the SU network from the PU transmit- 1001
ter. Fig. 14(a) shows the performance results for variable net- 1002
work density for a fixed detection threshold of −94 dBm where 1003
20% of the nodes are fabricating attackers. In all of our experi- 1004
ments in the previous sections, we considered 25 SU nodes in a 1005
200 m× 200 m location area (i.e., density of 625 SUs per km2). 1006
In Fig. 14(a), however, the number of SU nodes is varied from 1007
only 5 nodes up to 50 nodes in the same area size which results 1008
in a density of 125 up to 1250 SUs per km2. Therefore, we 1009
consider a variety of scenarios from a sparse to a dense SU net- 1010
work. In this set of simulations we use the same setup (e.g. PU 1011
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Fig. 14. Scalability analysis in terms of (a) SU network density and (b)
distance from PU. Attack scenario: 20% fabricating attackers. Detection
threshold = −94 dBm.
activity, SU mobility, 15 km distance from the PU transmitter)1012
as described in Table I.1013
For a higher SU network density, there are more nodes in1014
the neighborhoods and in general there is more diversity in the1015
network that can be exploited by cooperation. As a result, both1016
PM D and PF A should improve when the density of the network1017
is increased. However, at the same time, in a denser network,1018
the attackers get greater opportunity to propagate their falsified1019
values in the network if they are not properly contained by the1020
trust management scheme. The results presented in Fig. 14(a)1021
shows that using the context-oblivious trust, the false alarm rate1022
of the 375 SUs/km2 case is higher than that of the 125 SUs/km21023
case. For denser networks, then the error rates decrease, but1024
both false alarm and missed-detection rates remain relatively1025
high even in the densest case. This confirms that the attackers1026
are not mitigated adequately by the context-oblivious scheme.1027
In contrast, our proposed context-aware trust scheme limits1028
the impact of the attackers and therefore, increasing the den-1029
sity of the nodes is beneficial as the diversity is increased. In1030
conclusion, our proposed trust-aware DCSS scheme scales well1031
with the network density and performs notably better than the1032
context-oblivious trust regardless of the network density. In fact,1033
as it is clear from Fig. 14(a), the gap between the proposed1034
scheme and the contexts-oblivious scheme becomes more sig-1035
nificant for denser networks.1036
In Fig. 14(b), we analyze the scalability in terms of the dis-1037
tance between the SU network of 25 nodes and the PU trans-1038
mitter. Increasing the PU distance results in a decrease in the 1039
average received signal to noise ratio by the SU nodes, there- 1040
fore, the missed-detection rate increases with distance as shown 1041
in Fig. 14(b). Note that the false alarm rate depends on the noise 1042
level and not the signal strength, thus not shown. The results 1043
show that the proposed context-aware trust scheme performs 1044
significantly better than the context-oblivious scheme, regard- 1045
less of the distance. 1046
VIII. CONCLUSION 1047
We present a novel context-aware trust management scheme 1048
that is integrated into distributed cooperative spectrum sens- 1049
ing and is shown to significantly increase the resilience of the 1050
distributed cooperation to insistent spectrum sensing data falsi- 1051
fication (ISSDF) attacks. Unlike the existing trust schemes, the 1052
proposed method enables the secondary users to perform more 1053
informed trust evaluations of their peers based on the context 1054
(whether the primary user is absent or present.) As a result our 1055
trust scheme is effective in mitigating the attackers in realis- 1056
tic dynamic scenarios where the primary user of the channel 1057
frequently transitions between active and inactive. We evalu- 1058
ate our proposed trust management scheme under Always-Yes, 1059
Always-No, and fabricating ISSDF attacks via both theoretical 1060
analysis and extensive Monte Carlo simulations. We developed 1061
a realistic model where the mobile cognitive radio ad hoc net- 1062
work operates in TV white space and the primary user transmit- 1063
ter’s activity is changing over time. We show the scalability of 1064
the proposed scheme in terms of attack severity, network density 1065
and the distance of the secondary network from the primary user 1066
transmitter. Furthermore, the dynamic range of the sensitivity 1067
of the cognitive radios is shown to be considerably improved, 1068
benefiting from the proposed context-aware trust scheme. 1069
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